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A MEDIATION-BASED APPROACH TO
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS IN NIGERIA
Akingbolahan Adeniran*
I. Introduction
The primary aim of this reform is to evolve a
comprehensive body of legal principles and rules governing
companies and suitable for the circumstances of the
country. These rules should facilitate business activities in
the country and protect the interests of the investors, the
public and of the Nation as a whole.'
A. General Background
The quotation above is a summary of the objective of the
Nigerian Law Reform Commission in its 1988 review of the old
Companies Act of 1968 (1968 Act).2 The review culminated in
the enactment of the Companies and Allied Matters Act of 1990
(the Act or CAMA), 3 the extant legislation on the law of
corporations. The CAMA is a fairly comprehensive statute which
has codified4 a number of statutory and common law rules relating
to corporations, including corporate reorganization, the principal
* Associate, Adeniran & Adeniran. LL.B., 2000, University of Lagos; BL, 2002,
Nigerian Law School; LL.M., 2003, Harvard Law School. This essay was originally
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the LL.M. degree. The author is
indebted to Chioma Agomo, Ade lpaye, George Nnona, Mohammed Chicktay, Foluso
Shado, and Michael Djan for their helpful comments.
I NIGERIAN LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT ON THE REFORM OF NIGERIAN
COMPANY LAW 4 (1991) [hereinafter NIGERIAN COMPANY REPORT].
2 Companies Act of 1968, No. 51 (Nig.) [hereinafter 1968 Act]. This Act was
based on the U.K. Companies Act of 1948.
3 Companies and Allied Matters Act, No. 1 (1990) (Nig.) [hereinafter CAMA].
4 The term "codified" is used loosely here. Although comprehensive, the CAMA
is certainly not a Code.
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focus of this paper.' Amazingly (and in spite of the reform effort),
this area of the law has received relatively little attention over the
entire period of its existence. Noteworthy in this regard is the fact
that the CAMA and the 1968 Act have virtually identical
provisions on the subject.6
One of the mechanisms put in place by the above enactments
for the restructuring of companies in distress is a scheme of
arrangement or compromise subject to approval by members and
creditors of a company and to supervision by the court.7
Historically, schemes of arrangement first appeared in the English
Joint Stock Companies Arrangements Act of 1870, which allowed
companies in liquidation to make compositions or arrangements
with creditors! With slight modifications, this statutory procedure
survived in Nigeria in its original form. 9 It is the only internally
generated procedure available for the rehabilitation of distressed
companies. For this reason, it is considered to be part of the law
on insolvency.'° Other legal procedures for dealing with corporate
failure in Nigeria are receivership and liquidation."
Judicial incursion into the subject area is rare and usually
merely procedural. 2 The paucity of cases shows that companies in
Nigeria hardly ever resort to the supposedly remedial procedure. 3
5 See CAMA, Pt. XVI.
6 Compare id. with Companies Act of 1968 §§ 197-200 (employing similar
language in the sections dealing with corporate reorganization).
7 For provisions relating to compositions and schemes of arrangement with non-
corporate debtors (individuals and firms), see the Bankruptcy Act, No. 16 (1990) (Nig.),
amended by Bankruptcy (Amendment), No. 109 (1992) (Nig.).
8 See English Joint Stock Companies Arrangements Act of 1870. This provision
was amended by § 24 of the English Companies Act of 1900 to include participation by
members. English Companies Act of 1900. In 1907, § 38 of the Companies Act of 1907
entitled companies outside of liquidation to use the facility. Companies Act of 1907,
(Eng.); see also David Milman, Reforming Corporate Rescue Mechanisms, in THE
REFORM OF UNITED KINGDOM COMPANY LAW 415, 416 (John de Lacy ed., 2002)
(detailing a brief summary of the evolution of schemes of arrangement in England).
9 See generally CAMA.
10 Id.
I See id. Pt. XIV-XV.
12 Cf P.O. ADEREMI, MODERN DIGEST OF CASE LAW 40-42 (2000) (citing cases
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Broadly speaking and without attempting to be exhaustive, this
non-utilization may be explained in two ways. First, it could be
that corporate failure is a rare phenomenon in Nigeria. Secondly,
it may be that companies find the provisions inconvenient,
ineffective, and, by extension, inefficient.14 Without necessarily
concluding at this point that the second reason is entirely
satisfactory, it must be pointed out that the first explanation is
quite untenable, particularly in light of the wave of bank failures in
the early nineties."
It is rather unfortunate that the current law on corporate
reorganization in Nigeria still smacks of antiquated nineteenth
century British experimentation gone sour.16 At the time of the
introduction of the scheme of arrangement in England, corporate
entities were generally viewed with a measure of suspicion.17 One
commentator describes the prevalent attitude in the following
words:
Early companies legislation paid little attention to the
rehabilitation of distressed companies. The assumption
was that if a company fell into difficulties the problem
14 Throughout this paper, any reference to efficiency should be interpreted in the
context of Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency. A transaction is efficient in this sense if there is a
total wealth increase for the affected parties or the aggregate monetary gains exceed the
aggregate monetary losses. The main problem with this model in the present context is
that it may promote exploitation of minority interests. As is detailed in Pt. II, this paper
will also adopt the concept of equity, which will be used to mitigate the exploitative
effects of Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency. Another model usually employed by scholars of law
and economics is Parteo Efficiency. A transaction is said to be Parteo-efficient if all
affected parties experience a net utility gain or no party experiences a loss. This model is
often criticized for its non-pragmatism because in reality there are hardly any policies
that do not leave at least one party worse off.
15 See Nigeria: Bank Failure Not Yet Over, AFR. NEWS ONLINE, Apr. 13, 2003, at
http://allafrica.com/stories/200304130041.html (highlighting a period of commercial and
merchant bank growth in Nigeria from 1985 to 1992 and the subsequent decline in the
number of banks from 120 to 89 due to bank failures).
16 See CORK COMMrrEE REPORT: A GUIDE FOR BANKERS, FINANCE DIRECTORS AND
OTHERS CONCERNED WITH THE PROVISION OF CREDIT TO BUSINESS, 1982, Cmnd. 8558
[hereinafter Cork Committee Report]. Between 1977 and 1982, a major review of the
insolvency law and practice in England was carried out by the Cork Committee. This
effort led to dramatic changes in the area of corporate reorganization in England. The
changes further developed the concept of corporate rescue and put mechanisms in place
for the salvation of distressed companies. The emphasis was more on rescue than on
satisfaction of claims against company assets. See id.
17 See Milman, supra note 8.
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would be terminal and the best solution would be
liquidation. Companies were artificial legal entities,
viewed with considerable suspicion in many quarters, and
few persons would shed a tear about an untimely "death." 8
In spite of a global attitudinal change towards corporations in
the twentieth century, the law in Nigeria has remained
unchanged.' Today, the corporate form is seen as a veritable
vehicle for economic development.21 It is the most significant form
of business association throughout the developed and developing
world.2' As Professor Farrar put it, "it is a characteristic of the
modem economy that production is typically carried out by firms,
not by individuals. 22 According to Willard Hurst, with specific
reference to the United States, "the corporate form has served to
increase market activity by assisting entrepreneurs to muster
scattered capital and to control its use when it has been
assembled., 23 In the area of corporate reorganization, the present
trend worldwide is manifested by the growing literature on the
concept of corporate rescue.24
Shortly, it will become apparent that the law of corporate
18 Id.
19 Compare CAMA, No. 1, Pt. XVI, with 1968 Act, §§ 197-200 (noting the
similarities in the wording of the two acts).
20 Cf. WILLARD HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY: DIFFERENT
MODES OF BARGAINING AMONG INTERESTS 48-50 (1982) (discussing the evolution of the
corporate form in the United States in response to new technology, larger markets,
entrepreneurial ambition, and the possibility for greater economies of scale).
21 Cf. Elisa Westfield, Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise
Responsibility: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the 21s' Century, 42 VA. J. INT'L L.
1075, 1082 (2002) (discussing the importance of corporate responsibility, since
corporations are the planet's dominant institution).
22 JOHNH. FARRARETAL., FARRAR'SCOMPANYLAW3 (3d ed. 1991).
23 HURST, supra note 20, at 48-49.
24 See, e.g., ALICE BELCHER, CORPORATE RESCUE: A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO
INSOLVENCY LAW (1997); DAVID BROWN, CORPORATE RESCUE: INSOLVENCY LAW IN
PRACTICE (1996) [hereinafter BROWN 1996]; JAMES R. LINGARD, CORPORATE RESCUES
AND INSOLVENCIES (2d ed. 1989); ANKER SORENSON & PAUL J. OMAR, CORPORATE
RESCUE PROCEDURES IN FRANCE (1996); Broude, How the Rescue Culture Came to the
United States and the Myths That Surround Pt. If, 16 INSOLVENCY L. & PRAC. 194
(2000); Campbell, Company Rescue in Australia: Does the New Voluntary Arrangement
Procedure Provide Guidance for Possible Reforms in the UK?, 10 INSOLVENCY L. &
PRAC. 18 (1994); Rajak & Henning, Business Rescue for South Africa, 116 S. AFR. L.J.
262 (1999).
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reorganization in Nigeria is in dire need of reform. This paper
addresses that need. The objective is not different from that of the
Nigerian Law Reform Commission fifteen years ago at the time of
the last major revision of company law in Nigeria.2 ' The timing is
significant for two reasons. First, in view of the resolve by the
present administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo to attract
foreign investors to Nigeria, 26 a sophisticated insolvency law and
practice regime is indispensable in the realization of this goal.
Second, in recent times, there has been some activity - both
nationally and internationally - toward reform of insolvency laws
around the globe.27 In a recent forum on "Insolvency and Risk
Management" hosted by the World Bank, Gordon Johnson, the
Bank's chief legal advisor, made the following remark:
"Insolvency has become a pressing issue not only for the
developing countries, but now also for the industrial countries.
The current state of the world economy underscores the
importance of having effective insolvency and creditor rights
systems to allay investor fears and enable better management of
default risks., 28 Indeed, Nigeria needs a pro-investment regime.
As an emerging market in sub-Saharan Africa, the country can
no longer afford to ignore the advantages of a corporate rescue
regime, not only to domestic and foreign investors, but also to the
country at large. As predicted by the Law Reform Commission,
"[t]aking into consideration the present economic climate where
companies are competing for dwindling finances, raw materials,
markets, skilled manpower etc., it is envisaged that these methods
25 See NIGERIAN COMPANY REPORT, supra note 1.
26 President Olusegun Obasanjo, Inaugural Speech Following His Swearing-in as
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (May 29, 1999) (transcript available at
http://www.nopa.net/UsefulInformation/PresidentialSpeeches/29may99.htm) (citing
the creation of an environment conducive for investment as one of his top priorities).
27 See generally DAVID BROWN, CORPORATE RESCUE: REPORT FOR THE MINISTRY OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Nov. 2000), at http://www.med.govt.nz/ri/insolvency/
tiertwo/rescue/rescue.pdf [hereinafter Brown 2000] (discussing the need to reform
insolvency laws in New Zealand in order to regulate and minimize the cost of corporate
failure).
28 See Press Release, World Bank, Rebuilding the Trust: World Bank Hosts Global
Forum on Insolvency and Risk Management (Feb. 4, 2002), at http://web.worldbank.
org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20089489-menuPK:34457-pagePK:
34370-piPK:34424-theSitePK:4607,00.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
2003]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
of re-organizing company structure for the optimum utilization of
these resources will take on more significance in the near future.,
29
In a fiercely competitive marketplace, access to capital is
certainly a key factor in the equation of company survival.3" The
ability of a company to raise capital to carry out its authorized
business or objectives depends on a combination of factors,
including, but not limited to the following: the market outlook for
its products and services, the quality of its management team, the
state of the economy and level of development of the capital
markets, the ability of an investor (shareholder or debt holder) to
enforce mutually agreed upon terms against a company, and the
extent to which investors have control over arrangements or
proposals to alter their financial entitlements or other obligations
that attach to a company as a result of capital contribution.3 This
paper is directly concerned with the regulation of such
arrangements.
B. Scope of the Paper
The guiding philosophy behind the proposed reform is
twofold: (a) to create an enabling environment for the
development of a reorganization plan that maximizes the chances
of an insolvent (or nearly insolvent) company, or as much as
possible of its business, successfully continuing in existence;3 2 and
(b) to ensure fair treatment of all the parties directly affected by an
arrangement. It should be noted that while the first prong is
basically an efficiency question, the second prong relates to equity.
The paper will take on the arduous task of balancing these two
important, but often conflicting, approaches. In reconciling the
approaches, the overriding consideration will be what the
individual parties would have agreed upon ex ante.
In a chronological manner, the second part will set out, in
29 NIGERIAN COMPANY REPORT, supra note 1, at 241.
30 See LINGARD, supra note 24, at 2.
31 Cf id. at 1-5 (stating that the success of a company depends upon its
performance in three broad categories: production, marketing, and financial controls).
32 Cf Corporations Act of 2001, Pt. 5.3A, § 435A(a) (Austl.). As Judge Jacob
stated in R. A. Securities v. Mercantile Credit Co., 3 All E.R. 581, 584 (1995), "It is
better to keep the show on the road than close it down even if creditors have to accept
less than their nominal (but not achievable) entitlement." Of course, this statement is too
broad and is qualified in later parts of the decision.
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considerable detail, the law on arrangements and compromise in
Nigeria. This part will also identify key issues and topical areas of
discourse to be addressed in later parts. Employing the twin
standards of efficiency and equity, the third part will evaluate the
pros and cons of the present regime. The part will begin by
highlighting the peculiar features of the operating environment for
corporations in Nigeria. It will then proceed to summarize other
procedures which can be used for the treatment of "sick"
companies, and this section will be followed by an evaluation of
the law as it is, bearing in mind all the surrounding circumstances.
Finally, in adopting a comparative law approach, the paper will
conclude with an attempt to proffer solutions to previously
identified problems. Specifically, the possibility of adopting a
mediation-based approach to corporate reorganization will be
given special attention, with emphasis on the advantages it offers
in terms of quick resolution of cases and sympathy to the interests
of the various parties. Some of the other issues to be addressed in
this part include: the desirability or otherwise of extensive court
involvement in the reorganization process, the relative costs
involved in reorganizing a company, the need for a moratorium or
stay on all enforcement proceedings against a company about to
undergo reorganization, and the question whether an incumbent
management team should be allowed to remain in control while
the company is being restructured.
C. Terminology
While the CAMA provides a definition of the expression
"arrangement," it is silent on the meaning of "compromise." 33 An
arrangement is a form of corporate restructuring defined as "any
change in the rights or liabilities of members, debenture holders or
creditors of a company or any class of them or in the regulation of
a company."34 A somewhat narrower meaning is usually attributed
33 See CAMA § 537.
34 Id.; see also Corporations Act of 2001 § 9 (defining an arrangement as including
"a reorganization of the share capital of a body corporate by the consolidation of shares
of different classes, by the division of shares into shares of different classes, or by both
of those methods"). This definition, though restrictive in nature, has been given a liberal
meaning by Australian courts. See e.g., In re International Harvester Co. of Australia
Pty. Ltd. (1953) VLR 669, 672 ("It is now plain that the word 'arrangement' is not
restricted in its meaning by its association with 'compromise."' (citing In re Guardian
2003]
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to the expression "compromise." It has been described as
involving "a settlement of dispute and some degree of give and
take by each side." " It is similar to a composition which entails an
agreement between an insolvent debtor and two or more of his
creditors by which the creditors agree to accept a partial
satisfaction of their claims and forgive the balance.36 It seems,
therefore, that while a compromise necessarily involves a dispute,
an arrangement does not.37 Nevertheless, both terms are used
interchangeably throughout this paper. The term "reorganization"
includes "arrangements" and "compromise."
A company is insolvent if it is unable to pay its debts as they
become due. 3' An insolvent company has insufficient current
assets to satisfy the claims of all its creditors.39 In addition, a
company may be practically insolvent even though it is still
technically solvent." The term "distressed company" shall be
used to denote both categories of companies. "Rescue" is a term
of art meaning "the application of formal legal rescue procedures
Assurance Co., 1 Ch. 431, 450 (Eng. C.A. 1917)).
35 ROMAN TOMASIC & STEPHEN BOTTOMLEY, CORPORATIONS LAW IN AUSTRALIA
829 (1995) (citing Isles v. Daily Mail Newspaper Ltd. (1912) 14 CLR 193, 196-98). In
In re Interfirst Fin. & Sec. Ltd. [1993] FHCLR 421, 424, Judge Eigbedion adopts the
JOWiTT'S DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW 404 (2d ed. 1977) definition, defining a
compromise as "an adjustment of claims in dispute by mutual concession."
36 ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW
STUDENTS: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 229 (3d ed. 2002).
37 See In re Guardian Assurance Co., 1 Ch. 431, 431 (Eng. C.A. 1917)). In Yinka
Folawiyo & Sons Ltd. v. T.A. Hammond Projects Ltd. 3 FRCR 143 (1977), Judge
Karibi-White made the following distinction:
An 'arrangement' in my view is not stricto sensu synonymous with a
'compromise' .... [A]greements which enable the majority of the creditors to
accept less than is due to them may be a compromise on the Pt. of the creditors
as a whole. But where.., the shareholders do not give up anything in the
amalgamation of the company... no compromise as such [is] involved, but
only an arrangement resulting in the fusion of the two companies.
38 According to § 408(d) of the CAMA, this constitutes a ground for petitioning the
court to wind up a company.
39 Cf HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 36, at 231 (stating that an entity is insolvent
when its liabilities greatly exceed its current assets).
40 See id. (discussing how an entity may still appear solvent when its property value
exceeds its debt value on the company's balance sheet, and yet is technically insolvent
because its liabilities exceed assets).
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at the point of the imminence or actuality of insolvency."'" It
involves pulling a company from the jaws of death in order to give
it a new lease on life.
4 2
II. Arrangements and Compromise in Nigeria
A. Introduction
Part XVI of the CAMA deals exclusively with arrangements
and compromise, 43 and will be the primary statutory point of
reference. Because of the relatively undeveloped state of the area
of the law, only a handful of cases on questions relating to
arrangements and compromise have actually come up before local
courts in Nigeria.44 It is therefore not uncommon for learned text
writers and commentators in enunciating the law on the subject to
refer to decisions of foreign courts regarding similar provisions. 4
Such decisions are of persuasive authority before Nigerian
courts .46
An initial question is: why reorganize? Briefly, a company in
distress may wish to reorganize its finances in order to attain an
optimal capital structure which will allow it to carry on business in
a more efficient manner, settle outstanding claims of creditors,
retain valued employees, and still have some leftover value for its
shareholders. 7  Predictably, not every reorganized company
eventually becomes successful, and quite a number end up in
41 BROWN 1996, supra note 24, at 1.
42 Cf SORENSON & OMAR, supra note 24, at xiii (discussing how the procedure of
corporate rescue can give a bankrupt company a chance at survival and avoid
liquidation).
43 See CAMA, Pt. XVI.
44 See, e.g., Alli v. Okulaja, 2 All NLR 35 (1972); Nig. Nat'l Supply Co. Ltd. v.
Alhaji Hamajoda Sabana and Co. Ltd. and Others, 5 NWLR (Pt. 40) 205 (1988);
Oladiran v. State, 1 NWLR (Pt. 14) 75 (1986).
45 See C.O. OKONKWO, INTRODUCTION TO NIGERIAN LAW 1-8 (1980) (noting the
influence of British law); A.E.W. PARK, THE SOURCES OF NIGERIAN LAW 132 (1963)
(noting the coexistence of English and Nigerian customary law).
46 See Alli, 2 All NLR at 35; Nigeria Nat'l Supply, 5 NWLR at 205; Oladiran, 1
NWLR at 75.
47 Cf. SORENSON & OMAR, supra note 24, at 7 (describing the various reasons to
consider corporate rescue as opposed to liquidation).
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liquidation.48  Even where this is the case, sophisticated
reorganization regimes help to maximize the returns to creditors
and shareholders alike.49 The question will be addressed in greater
detail in the final part of this Comment.
B. Initiating an Arrangement or a Compromise
Section 539(1) confers jurisdiction on the Federal High Court
(the court) to order a meeting or meetings of members or classes of
members or creditors or classes of creditors of a company where
an arrangement or a compromise is proposed between the
company and the said members or creditors.5' The application to
the court may be made by the company, any of its members or
creditors, or, in the case of a company being wound up, by the
liquidator.5 From the wording of the section,52 it seems that the
court is not required to go into the substance of the matter at this
stage. The application is preliminary and the court need only
concern itself with determining whether the company has satisfied
the prerequisites for undertaking an arrangement or a
compromise. 3
The court's power in ordering the meeting or meetings is
discretionary in view of the non-obligatory language of the
section. 4 The applicant is required to show sufficient cause why
the court should exercise such discretion in its favor and also that
there is likelihood of securing the required majority vote in support
of the arrangement or compromise. In reaching a decision, the
48 See L1NGARD, supra note 24, at 36.
49 Cf. id. at 41 (showing how a partial rescue, which involves the liquidation of a
major subsidiary, can nonetheless benefit creditors and shareholders).
50 See CAMA § 539(1).
51 Id.
52 Note in particular the phrase "on application, in a summary way." Id.
53 See id. § 539(3) ("If the court is satisfied as to the fairness of the compromise or
arrangement, it shall sanction the same and the compromise or arrangement shall be
binding .... ").
54 See id. § 539(1) ("Where a compromise or arrangement is proposed between a
company and its creditors or any class of them, the court may... order a meeting .... ").
55 See Yinka Folawiyo & Sons Ltd. v. T.A. Hammond Projects Ltd., 3 FRCR 143
(1977). In Mrs. Scholastica 0. Casagrande v. Mayas Quarry Indus. Ltd. & Ors.
[1993] FHCLR 82, 88, Judge Egbo-Egbo described these two conditions as "pre-
requisites ... sine qua non for ... success of this type of application."
[Vol. 29
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court considers both the memorandum of the scheme and an
explanatory statement made pursuant to section 540 of the CAMA,
which are to be produced before it along with the application. 6
In addition, before ordering the holding of the meeting or
meetings, a court will ensure that the proposed "arrangement" or
"compromise" falls within the meaning of the terms as used under
the CAMA. Thus, a unilateral proposal made to the court by a
company stipulating how the company intends to or plans to settle
its indebtedness has been held to fall outside the meaning of the
expression "compromise" under section 539 of the CAMA.57 In
order to propel the court into action, the proposed arrangement or
compromise has to be between the company and its members or
any class of them and/or between the company and its creditors or
any class of them, as the case may be.58 Similarly, a court may
refuse to order a meeting if the arrangement does not have the
approval of the company either through the board or, if
appropriate, by means of a simple majority of the members in
general meeting. 9 Nonetheless, the court may exercise its
discretion in favor of ordering the meeting if it is satisfied that
there is reasonable probability that it would serve a useful or
functional purpose.6"
Furthermore, the provisions relating to arrangements and
compromise under the CAMA apply only to companies "liable to
be wound up under [the] Act."'" Section 408(d) of the Act
provides: "A company may be wound up... if the company is
unable to pay its debts." Apparently, a company approaching
insolvency cannot take advantage of the procedure unless a
resolution that the company be wound up is first passed.
56 See CAMA §§ 540(1)(a), 540(2). The statement must be sent with every notice
summoning the meeting or meetings of members and/or creditors to be convened. It is
meant to explain the effect of the compromise or arrangement and state any material
interests of the directors of the company.
57 See In re Interfirst Fin. & Sec. Ltd. [1993] FHCLR 421, 424 ("To act on [a] one-
sided proposal by a company, the court will be unwittingly lending its aid to fraud on the
public."); see also Andruchue Inv. Plc. v. Fin. Mediators (Nig.) Ltd. [1994] FHCLR 51
(on the same point).
58 In re Interfirst Fin. & Sec., Ltd [1993] FHCLR at 424.
59 In re Savoy Hotel Ltd., 3 All E.R. 646, 657 (Ch. 1981).
60 Id.
61 See CAMA § 539(6).
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Ironically, this is no longer the position in England.62 Worthy of
mention is the finding of the Cork Committee on Insolvency Law
and Practice to the effect that the procedure was used mostly by
solvent companies in England and rarely by insolvent ones.63 This
is intuitive from the perspective of a company wishing to act
quickly in order to overturn a perceived downward trend in
business and in anticipation of future prosperity.
This preliminary application for an order of court convening
the appropriate meeting or meetings is the first of two applications
that need to be made to the court. At the time of the second
application, the court will be called upon to sanction or approve
the arrangement or compromise. The fact that a court grants the
first order does not necessarily mean that the proposed scheme will
be sanctioned in the second application. As the Full Court stated
in In re Norfolk Island and Byron Bay Whaling Ltd,64 "[I]t is going
too far to say that the grant of leave to summon meetings under
[section 411(1) of the Australian Corporations Law]65 necessarily
amounts to a determination that the proposed arrangement is one
which falls within the scope of the section." 66 In ordering the
meeting or meetings, a court may also order that a moratorium be
put in place if specifically sought by the applicant.
C. Classification
In making an order under section 539(1), the court is
empowered to summon meetings of different classes of members
and creditors where appropriate. Because individual members of a
particular class are in the best position to determine their fate, a
great deal of attention is paid to classification in order to prevent
the occurrence of confiscation or injustice. 67 The question of what
constitutes a class is perhaps the most problematic issue for
62 See supra note 8.
63 See CORK COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 16, at 404. Between 1977 and 1982,
this Committee conducted a major review of Insolvency Law and Practice in the United
Kingdom.
64 [1970] 1 NSWR 221, 241 (Wales).
65 This is similar to section 539(1) of the CAMA.
66 In re Norfolk Island [1970] 1 NSWR 241.
67 See Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd [1892] 2 QB 573. (Eng.); see also
TOMASIC & BOTrOMLEY, supra note 35, at 196.
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practitioners in the field.68 Unfortunately, the CAMA does not
provide any useful guidance on division of members and creditors
into classes. In practice, the applicant is usually saddled with the
responsibility of ensuring that the classes are properly constituted.
Where the applicant fails to do this, the court may refuse to
sanction the arrangement or compromise.69
It remains to be decided whether or not the court lacks
jurisdiction to sanction a scheme of arrangement approved by the
requisite majorities at improperly constituted meetings, whether of
classes or otherwise.7" This writer believes that the paramount
consideration in any application for the sanctioning of a scheme is
fairness. If, in spite of an improper classification, a scheme is
found to be fair, it should be sanctioned. However, improper
classification is a strong, though inconclusive, indication of lack of
fairness.71
Proper classification is crucial because, once approved by the
court, an arrangement becomes binding not only on the company,
but also on all members and creditors alike, whether or not they
were entitled to vote at the meetings.72 The creation of too many
classes should not be encouraged, however, because it could
prevent approval of potentially pie-increasing schemes. In In re
Crusader Ltd., Judge Thomas was of the view that it "causes
unnecessary inconvenience, artificiality, and increases the
possibility of veto by a limited group."73 Maintaining the delicate
balance between recognition of the right of individual class
members to determine their own interest and the need to protect
68 See BROWN 1996, supra note 24, at 626; see also THE COMPANY LAW REVIEW
STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: FINAL
REPORT, Vol. 1,276 (2001) [hereinafter COMPANY LAW REVIEW].
69 See In re Hellenic and Gen. Trust Ltd. [1976] 1 WLR 123.
70 See In re Hawk Ins. Co. Ltd. [2001] 2 B.C.L.C. 480. (Eng.) (The position in
England is that the court lacks jurisdiction even when no one objects to the scheme.); see
also COMPANY LAW REVIEW, supra note 68, at 276.
71 See CAMA, § 539 (3). 1 find support for this view in the mandatory language of
the section, which states, "If the court is satisfied as to the fairness of the compromise or
arrangement, it shall sanction the same .... See also EPHRAIM MADUELOSI ASOMUGHA,
COMPANY LAW IN NIGERIA UNDER THE COMPANIES AND ALLIED MATTERS ACT 395
(1994).
72 See CAMA, § 539 (3); see also BROWN 1996, supra note 24, at 628; see also the
section of this paper on "Effect of Court Approval," at 25, infra.
73 See In re Hawk Insurance, 2 B.C.L.C. at 519.
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the whole process from derailment is what gives this area its
special significance.
According to Judge Bowen, in his classic formulation of the
test to be applied in the constitution of separate classes, a court is
bound to
give such a meaning to the term 'class' as will prevent the
section74 being worked so as to result in confiscation and
injustice, and it must be confined to those persons whose
rights are so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to
consult together with a view to their common interest.
75
In that case, holders of matured policies who had a vested cause of
action in respect of their claims were held to constitute a separate
class distinct from holders of subsisting policies whose claims
were contingent in nature. However, when the same court was
presented with a similar set of facts in re Hawk Insurance
Company Ltd.,76 the application of the test led to a different
outcome.
According to the facts, the liquidators of a company engaged
in writing motor-vehicle insurance and non-life business submitted
a petition for the approval of the court to a scheme of arrangement
made between the company and the scheme creditors as defined
under the scheme. There were two types of creditors - those with
vested rights and those with contingent rights. Creditors with
admitted claims (that is, the creditors with vested rights) were
entitled to receive 100% of their claims, while the other creditors
were entitled to either 75% or 50% depending on the nature of
their claims. After holding that "[n]either the rights released or
varied, nor the new rights given under the scheme were so
dissimilar as to make it impossible [for] the creditors ... to consult
together with a view to their common interest," the English Court
of Appeal upheld a single meeting of all the creditors and
74 The equivalent of section 539 of the CAMA.
75 Sovereign Life Assurance Co. v. Dodd [1892] 2 QB 573, 583 (Eng.). In the
United States, by virtue of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code), I 1
U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1978), a reorganization plan may place a claim or an interest in a
particular class only if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims
or interests of such class. Accordingly, all creditors of equal rank with claims against the
same property should be placed in the same class. In re Martin's Point Ltd. P'ship, 12
B.R. 721 (1981).
76 [2001] 2 B.C.L.C. 480 (Eng.).
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sanctioned the scheme under section 425 of the Companies Act of
1985." 7
A rule of thumb is that every case should be decided on its
facts. As these two cases illustrate, the application of the test is
rather eclectic, particularly within broad groupings of members or
creditors, such as unsecured creditors or preferred shareholders.
Nevertheless, it is comforting to know that a few settled principles
of law exist in this fuzzy terrain. For instance, where there are
secured and unsecured creditors, separate meetings will usually be
ordered.78 Meetings of members and of creditors are also held
separately. The inevitable conclusion, however, is that questions
of classification will continue to be a thorn in the flesh of judges
for quite some time to come.
D. Voting Requirements and the Importance of Disclosure
Apart from classification, the Act also allows members and
creditors to be the architect of their commercial fate through its
voting requirements. Section 539(2) provides for approval of the
scheme by a majority representing no less than 75% in value of the
shares held by members or of the creditors' interest. 79 This reliance
on the will of the majority in ascertaining the interest of the whole
group is absolute. There is no provision for discounting or
disqualifying the votes of interested persons.8" In addition, the
approval requirement applies only to members and creditors
"present and voting either in person or by proxy." Thus, with one
narrow exception, other members and creditors are deemed to
lack sufficient interest in the outcome of the vote.
77 Id. at 480. One of the factors that influenced the court's decision was the fact
that no creditor sought to oppose the scheme in the application of the sanction. The issue
of classification was raised by the court on its own. See also id. § 425.
78 See In re Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd. [1991] 5 A.C.S.R. 304. (Austl.).
79 See Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1978). In the case of
creditors under the Bankruptcy Code, the United States treats 'majority' not only in
terms of value of interest, but also in terms of creditors holding such interest. Thus, in
addition to approval by two-thirds majority, there must also be approval by more than
one-half in number of the allowed claims held by the creditors.
80 Id. Also referred to as "connected" or "related" persons. This includes
shareholders and directors with significant interests as creditors.
81 See pg. 23, infra. Without notifying absentee members and creditors, if there are
material changes to a proposed scheme at the time of the meeting, a court may refuse to
sanction the scheme.
2003]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Under Section 540(1) of the CAMA, the notice summoning the
meeting must be accompanied by a statement explaining the effect
of the compromise or arrangement and, in particular, stating any
material interests of the directors of the company (whether as
directors, members or as creditors of the company or otherwise)
and the effect of the arrangement or compromise on those interests
in so far as it is different from the effect on the like interest of
other persons. Where the reorganization affects the rights of
debenture holders, subsection (2) of the same section requires the
directors to provide similar explanation concerning the trustees of
any deed for securing the issue of the debenture.
The Act adopts a disclosure-based system as the principal
means of guaranteeing fair treatment of all the concerned parties.
The logic is that, if adequately informed, stakeholders will be able
to form a reasoned judgment as to whether to vote for or against a
scheme. The required standard of disclosure was well enunciated
by Judge Belgore in In re Lipton of Nigeria Ltd. "I consider the
explanatory statement fair, giving reasonable and necessary
information to enable each of its recipients understand the issue
and enable him to vote with a clear mind."82 Beyond this, however,
there is little guidance for companies contemplating
reorganization.83 Each company has to decide for itself the kind of
information to be revealed in the light of its peculiar
circumstances. Where the information is subsequently found by
the court to be inadequate, it would refuse to sanction the scheme.
E. The Process of Sanctioning by the Court
The second application to the court is one for an order
sanctioning the proposed scheme. As Judge Chadwick stated in In
re BTR Plc, "the court is not bound by the decision of the meeting.
A favorable resolution at the meeting represents a threshold which
must be surmounted before the sanction of the court can be
sought."84 At this stage, section 539(2) of the CAMA empowers
82 [1985] FHCLR 113, 122 (Nig.).
83 In Australia, for example, Regulation 5.1.01(1) of the Corporations Regulations
itemizes some of the matters that must be included in the explanatory statement. For an
explanation, see paragraph 3.06 of the Policy of the Director concerning Arrangements
under Section 192 of the Canada Business Corporations Act of 1998.
84 [2000] 1 B.C.L.C. 740 at 747 (Eng.).
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the court to refer such a scheme to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) which, in turn, is directed to "appoint one or
more inspectors to investigate the fairness of the said compromise
or arrangement and to make a written report thereon to the court
within a time specified by the court." '85 The most important
provision under this part of the CAMA"6 is arguably section
539(3). It stipulates the court's function during the sanctioning
process. For the sake of clarity, the subsection is set out below:
If the court is satisfied as to the fairness of the compromise
or arrangement, it shall sanction the same and the
compromise or arrangement shall be binding on all the
creditors or the class of creditors or on the members or the
class of members as the case may be, and also the company
or in the case of a company in the course of being wound
up, on the liquidator and contributories of the company.
87
One thing is clear from the above provisions - the court has no
power to sanction a scheme of arrangement unless it is satisfied as
to its fairness. The Herculean task therefore is in determining
when a scheme is fair. Because judges are not versed in corporate
and commercial matters, the CAMA gives the SEC a prominent
role in this area. While it is true that a major function of the SEC
is the regulation of investments and securities business in
Nigeria,88 one has to wonder why the mandate was not bestowed
upon the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) whose duty it is to
administer the provisions of the CAMA including part XVI.89
85 It is appropriate to mention at this stage that referral of questions of fairness to
the SEC was introduced for the first time under the CAMA. According to the Law
Reform Commission,
The Courts through no fault of theirs are generally ill-equipped to determine to
any degree of exactness whether such a scheme is actually fair or not. They
lack the necessary economic and accounting skills. We feel that in such a
situation the Courts should be in a position to refer such questions to experts in
the field. We propose that the Court should refer such matters to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, so that they may obtain expert and impartial report
upon which to base their decisions.
See NIGERIAN COMPANY REPORT, supra note 1, at 244. This is the only one of two
recommendations made by the Commission that is directly relevant for our purposes.
86 See CAMA, Pt. XVI (detailing arrangements and compromise generally).
87 CAMA, § 539(3).
88 See Investments and Securities Act, No. 45, section 8(a) (1999) (Nig.)
[hereinafter ISA].
89 See id. § 7(1)(a); see also CAMA, § 539(4) (providing that an order of court
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Perhaps the matter is one of pure expediency since the SEC is the
sole regulatory body empowered to approve schemes of
arrangement for the merger of two or more companies.9" This issue
is dealt with in part III.
In interpreting the equivalent English provisions, Judge
Maugham in In re Dorman, Long and Co. Ltd. stated:
It is plain that the duties of the court are two-fold. The first
is to see that the resolutions are passed by the statutory
majority in value and number... at a meeting or meetings
duly convened and held. The other duty is in the nature of
a discretionary power .... In my opinion, then, so far as
this second duty is concerned, what I have to see is whether
the proposal is such that an intelligent and honest man, a
member of the class concerned and acting in respect of his
interest, might reasonably approve.9"
The objective test enunciated in this case is the test of fairness
employed by the courts.92
With the newly carved out role for the SEC, it is yet to be seen
whether or not the courts will become more laidback in the
sanctioning process. This aside, a court has considerable
discretion in sanctioning or withholding sanction from a scheme.
In scrutinizing the voting process, "the court must see that the
class was fairly represented by those who attended the meeting and
that the statutory majority are acting bona fide and are not
coercing the minority in order to promote interests adverse to those
of the class whom they purport to represent."93 Where the court
sanctioning a scheme has no effect until a certified true copy of the order is delivered to
the CAC for registration).
90 See ISA, §§ 100(2)-(3). These provisions were formerly under Pt. XVII of the
CAMA before it was repealed by ISA.
91 [1934] Ch. 635, 655-57 (Eng.).
92 See In re Lipton of Nigeria Ltd., [1985] FHCLR 113, 122 (Nig.); In re
Cheseborough Prod. Indus. Ltd. and Lever Brothers Nigeria Ltd., Suit No.
FHC/L/M49/88 (Unreported).
93 In re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas & Pacific Ltd. [1891] 1 Ch. 213, 239.
(Eng.). In In re Cheseborough Products Industries Ltd., Judge Belgore also stated that
the pattern of voting will not be accepted at its face value "if a large percentage of the
majority shareholders that approved the scheme are shown to be in a position to gain a
disproportionate advantage from the scheme than other members of the class by reason
of their interest in some other capacity."
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feels that the majority did not decide the case in good faith, it may
refuse to sanction the scheme. 94 In the absence of any statutory
provision disqualifying the votes of interested persons, this inquiry
is perhaps the only protection available to the minority.
The court, however, is usually reluctant to substitute its own
judgment for that of the majority and will hardly do so where the
majority has made adequate disclosure of other interests.
Accordingly, in In re London Chartered Bank of Australia, the
court opined that:
if the creditors are acting on sufficient information and with
time to consider what they are about, and are acting
honestly... they are much better judges of what is in their
commercial advantage than the court can be .... [T]he
court ought to be slow to differ from them. It should do so
without hesitation if there is anything wrong; but it ought
not to do so, unless something is brought to the attention of
the court to show that there has been some material
oversight or miscarriage.95
As previously mentioned, another ground for refusing to
sanction a scheme is failure by a company to provide adequate
explanatory material in the statement accompanying every notice
summoning the statutory meeting or meetings. Apparently, this
omission is taken quite seriously by the Act because section 540(4)
provides that where a company makes default in complying with
the requirement, the company and every officer in default,
including any liquidator of the company, shall be liable to a fine.
However, the cases show that the courts are considerably flexible
on this issue, and the extent of information required to be disclosed
94 See Bankruptcy Reform Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (1978). In the United States,
the court may discount any acceptance or rejection not in good faith at the request of a
party in interest.
95 [1893] 3 Ch. 540, 544-45. (Eng.) (quoting In re English, Scottish, and
Australian Charted Bank [1893] 3 Ch. 385 (Eng.)); see also In re Hoare and Co. Ltd.
[1933] 150 L.T. 374 (Eng.). In the context of compulsory acquisition of the shares of
minority shareholders, Judge Maugham had the following to say:
[T]he court ought to regard the scheme as a fair one inasmuch as it seems to me
impossible to suppose that the court, in the absence of very strong grounds, is to
be entitled to set up its own view of the fairness of the scheme in opposition to
so very large a majority of the shareholders are concerned.
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in each individual case must be decided on its facts. For an
omission to be relevant, it must be of such magnitude that it would
materially affect the pattern of voting.96
Courts also take into consideration the issue of classification in
the sanctioning process. In In re Bond Corp. Holdings Ltd.,97
Judge Owen held that in determining classes of creditors, the court
must balance the danger of a compromise being forced on
dissenting creditors by a majority against the danger of a minority
of creditors having the power to veto a scheme. One problem with
classification is the risk of over-classification which may lead to
inefficient hold-ups. The interests of individual members or
individual creditors will not usually be identical. The test of
"dissimilarity making it impossible to consult together with a view
to a common interest" is rather vague and is bound to produce
different results with different judges. In drawing the line in
individual cases, the court must identify the underlying legal
character of the rights and obligations of the concerned parties
against the company, and must assess the way in which those
rights will be affected in the implementation of the scheme. 98
As a scheme need only be approved by a three-fourths majority
in value of the shares of members or interest of creditors being
present and voting, courts are usually vigilant in scrutinizing
amendments made at the meeting. Thus, if there is a material
change not brought to the prior notice of the non-attending
shareholders, the court will not sanction the scheme unless it is
satisfied that no reasonable shareholder would alter his decision as
to how to act on the scheme if the changes had been disclosed.99
Recall that the definition of "arrangement" under section 537
of the CAMA does not include certain changes "effected under
any other provision of [the Act] or by the unanimous agreement of
96 See In re Heron International NV [1994] 1 B.C.L.C. 667. (Eng.).
97 (1991) 5 A.C.S.R. 304 (Austl.).
98 Id. In In re Osiris Insurance Ltd., 1 B.C.L.C. 182 (1999) (Eng.), creditors who
were holders of different types of insurance policies with the applicant company were
held to belong to the same class because their interests were similar under the proposed
scheme.
99 In re Adams Int'l. Food Traders Pty. Ltd. (1988) 13 A.C.L.R. 586, 590 (Austl.).
See also In re Minster Assets Plc, (1985) B.C.L.C. 200 (Eng.); In re Jessel Trust Ltd.,
(1985) B.C.L.C. 119 (Eng.).
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all parties affected thereby."' 100 This provision has the effect of
taking away the power of a court to sanction a scheme covered by
another section of the Act unless there is compliance with the
additional requirements of that section. A good example is in the
case of an arrangement or compromise involving a reduction of
capital. In such a case, a company is obliged to observe the
provisions of sections 105 through 111 of the Act.'' Another
example is a scheme having the effect of converting a limited
liability company to an unlimited company." 2 Section 51 sets out
an elaborate and mandatory procedure for accomplishing this
task.' O3
The doctrine of ultra vires also limits the power of the court in
the sanctioning process. It is said that a court has no power to
sanction an unlawful or ultra vires arrangement or compromise.'04
However, if an ultra vires scheme is inadvertently approved by the
court, the order of court remains valid until it is set aside by
another valid judicial process.'0 5 The corollary of the latter
principle is arguably that the court is vested with the power to
sanction an ultra vires scheme (but not an unlawful scheme). All
the same, a court will be hard-pressed to sanction a scheme which
is manifestly ultra vires, particularly in the face of strong
opposition.
By way of judicial construct, it is submitted that a court will be
inclined to apply something akin to the feasibility test as adopted
in the United States0 6 in cases involving a 'hopelessly insolvent'
'
00 CAMA § 537.
101 These sections prescribe the procedure to be followed by a company proposing a
reduction of its share capital.
102 See Australian Sec. Comm'n. v. Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd. (1993) 177
C.L.R. 485 (Austl.); see also In re Glendale Land Dev. Ltd. (1982) 7 A.C.L.R. 171
(Austl.).
'0' See CAMA, § 51.
104 See In re Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., Ch. 41 (1939) (Eng.); see also re
Northumberland Ins. Co. Ltd. (No. 3) (1977) 3 A.C.L.R. 15.
105 See Barclays Bank v. British & Commonwealth Holdings Plc., B.C.C. 19 (1995);
affid. British & Commonwealth Holdings Plc. v. Barclays Bank, 1 W.L.R. 1 (1996)
(Eng. C.A.); see also Nicholl v. Eberhardt Co. Ltd., I Meg 402, 59 L. J. Ch. 103 (1889)
(Eng. C.A.).
106 The U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §1129(a) (1978), provides that the court
will not confirm a reorganization plan if it is likely to be followed by liquidation or
further reorganization.
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company. 1°7 In In re The South Melbourne Club Ltd,10 8 an
Australian court refused to grant an order convening the meetings
of members and creditors on the ground, inter alia, that it was
"impossible to say that [the] scheme [was] 'perfectly safe' or that
the public in the future would not be caused to suffer further
financial loss.' ' 109 Even though it is not expressed in the Act, the
power to "scrutinize the scheme ... is implicit in the inherent
power of the court and it can be invoked even if there is no
opposition to the scheme. . . "' The above proposition is
essential not only to avoid inefficient recurrence of restructuring,
but also to prevent the abuse of the statutory regime aimed
primarily at facilitating the earliest recovery of insolvent
companies.
F. Effect of Court Approval
An order of court sanctioning the proposed scheme takes effect
upon delivery by the company of a certified true copy of the order
to the CAC for registration.111 It operates as to bind "all the
creditors or the class of creditors or ... the members or the class of
members as the case may be, and also the company or in the case
of a company in the course of being wound up... the liquidator
and contributories of the company.""..2 A literal interpretation of
this provision would seem to suggest that only those members and
creditors who are summoned to the meetings or class meetings will
be bound by the scheme. However, in In re Tea Corporation
Ltd.,113 the court held that members (and creditors) excluded from
the court-ordered meetings on the ground that their rights were not
affected (unaltered) by the scheme were nevertheless bound by it.
107 See TOMASIC & BOTrOMLEY, supra note 35, at 126-32.
108 (1983) 1 A.C.L.C. 1063 (Austl.); see also re Mascot Home Furnishers Pty. Ltd.
(1970) V.R. 593 (AustI.).
109 (1983) 1 A.C.L.C. 1063, 1068 (Austl.)
110 In re Cheseborough Prod. Indus. Ltd. and Lever Brothers Nigeria Ltd., Suit No.
FHC/L/M49/88 (Unreported). Admittedly, the learned Judge in this case was referring to
the power of a court to go behind a statutory majority in investigating the fairness of a
scheme. However, it is submitted that the principle also applies in the above scenario
with equal force.
111 CAMA § 539(4).
112 Id. § 539(3).
113 1 Ch. 12(1904)(Eng. C.A.).
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The rights of claimants will be deemed unaltered in two
circumstances - where there is proof that they (usually subordinate
claimants) are not entitled to anything under an arrangement which
contemplates liquidation because the assets of the company are
insufficient to satisfy all claims and where their claims are to be
settled fully. In the latter case, it is said that the claim or interest is
not impaired."4 In both cases, it is possible to exclude the
claimants from the meetings.
Quite expectedly, this power of the court to bind
disenfranchised claimants is exercised with extreme caution. In
one case, the court refused to exclude stockholders from the
meetings even though it was highly unlikely that they would be
entitled to participate in any distribution of assets upon satisfaction
of the preferential claims of the creditors. 1 5 The court was
reluctant to proceed on this basis without some form of concession
by the excluded group that such non-entitlement was indeed the
case."16 Furthermore, where a class of claimants is wrongfully
excluded from the meetings, such a class will not be bound by the
scheme and the rights of the claimants will not thereby be
affected. 7 An example is where a class is excluded on the basis of
non-impairment when, in fact, it is required to give up certain
rights under a proposed scheme.
Given that it is essentially a contract between a company and
its members and creditors, a scheme of arrangement could have
varied effects depending upon its terms. It could lead to the loss of
priority hitherto enjoyed by the secured creditors or make
provision for the contribution of new value to the company. This
way the parties have total control over its provisions subject to the
114 See also U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (1978).
115 See In re British & Commonwealth Holdings Plc. (No. 3), 1 W.L.R. 672, 680
(1992) (Eng.).
116 See id. The Court held that:
The claim that there is even a remote possibility that sufficient [assets] might be
realized in the course of the administration or in a winding up to meet the
claims of the scheme creditors in full seems to me to verge on the fanciful.
However, in the absence of any concession, I cannot in this application proceed
on the assumption that there is no possibility that the claims of the scheme
creditors will be met in full. (Vinelott, J.)
Id.
117 See Sovereign Life Assurance v. Dodd, 2 Q.B. 573 (1892) (Eng. C.A.).
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constraint of according fair treatment to all the claimants. Hence,
it is the duty of the Court before sanctioning a scheme of
arrangement which would have the effect of binding
[dissenting] members of a class to give up legal rights, to
be satisfied that sensible business people might reasonably
consider the scheme was for the benefit of that class as
such.'18
G. Implementation and Termination of the Scheme
Unless the company is already in liquidation, the board of
directors will normally be in charge of implementing the terms of
the approved scheme. However, in view of its contractual nature,
it is possible to provide for the scheme to be supervised by an
independent person. At the proposal stage, this debtor-in-
possession model is different from what occurs in the United
States. Whereas any interested party may initiate an arrangement
or compromise in Nigeria, only a debtor company in the United
States is permitted to file a plan of reorganization within a
specified period of exclusivity.' 9 At the level of implementation,
the practice in both jurisdictions is similar.
Usually, a scheme will provide for its own termination and,
prior to such termination, it may be modified by a subsequent
scheme which receives the sanction of the court. 2° While it is still
in operation, the rights of claimants bound by its provisions must
be derived solely from the scheme. In other cases involving either
a failed scheme or a "once for all" scheme, the natural approach is
to hold claimants bound only to the extent that timely payments of
the various sums due to them under the scheme are made."'2 Where
there is failure to make payment when due and, in the absence of
any provision for extension, the parties must revert to the pre-
arrangement position.
118 In re Chevron (Sydney) Ltd. (1963) V.R. 249, 254 (Austl.).
119 Cf. CAMA § 539(1) and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §1121 (1978).
120 This is the only way of altering a scheme prior to its termination. See In re
Gasweld Pty. Ltd. (1986) 5 N.S.W.L.R. 494 (Austl.). See also Srimati Premila Devi v.
Peoples' Bank of Northern India, 4 All E.R. 337 (1938) (Eng. P.C.) (appeal taken from
Lahore H.C.).
121 See In re Master Butchers Ltd. (1976) C.L.C. 40-260 (Austl.).
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III. Perceived Problems
A. The Corporate Environment in Nigeria and Access to
Capital
There are two broad groupings of companies allowed to be
incorporated in Nigeria: public and private companies.'22 A private
company is a company - usually a small company - with less than
fifty members,"2  a minimum authorized share capital of
W10,000.00,124 and articles of association restricting the transfer of
shares.'25 For such a company, it is unlawful to raise capital
publicly, be it equity or loan capital. 2 6 On the other hand, a public
company - being typically a large company - is required to be
registered with a minimum authorized share capital of
N500,000.00. Subject to compliance with other provisions of the
Investments and Securities Act of 1999 (ISA), a public company is
also permitted to source its funds directly from the public.
The Act itself defines a small company as a private company
having a share capital with a yearly turnover of not more than N2
million and net assets of not more than Ni million. 127 For our
purposes, strict adherence to this definition is not necessary. The
point to be made is that most Nigerian companies are
characteristically small whether in terms of turnover, assets, or
revenue. These small companies considerably lag behind the large
public companies in competing for scarce resources. A reporter
captured the apparent imbalance when he noted:
[w]ith hundreds of small companies forced to close in
recent years by the deterioration in economic conditions,
122 CAMA § 21(2). Also, by section 21(1), there are three types of companies: a
company limited by shares, a company limited by guarantee and an unlimited company.
123 Not including persons who are bonafide in the employment of the company, or
were while in that employment and have continued after the termination of that
employment to be, members of the company. See CAMA § 22(3).
124 CAMA § 27(2)(a). This is roughly the equivalent of $75.00.
125 Id. § 22(2).
126 ISA § 44(1); see also CAMA § 22(5). In addition, one of the requirements for
listing on the Nigerian Stock Exchange is that the company to be listed must be
registered as a public limited liability company under the CAMA.
127 CAMA §§ 650, 351. Furthermore, the membership must not include aliens,
governments or government corporations or agencies and the directors must hold not less
than 51% of the equity share capital. See CAMA § 351(l)(d)-(f).
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especially inadequate credit, rising production costs and
diminishing consumer demand, the capacity of the
economy to provide full-time employment has
diminished.... [M]any banks are still reluctant to extend
credit to small- and medium-scale producers and prefer to
lend to big businesses and engage in foreign-exchange
related transactions. 
128
Sadly, the banking sector continues to be rather unsympathetic
towards the plight of small companies. Even when some banks are
willing to extend credit to these companies, by the statutorily
mandated requirement of obtaining adequate security before loan
disbursement, a hurdle is created.129 Invariably, this has the effect
of disqualifying the majority of small companies, which have little
or no assets to offer as collateral. In one sentence, the hostile
operating environment for the typical Nigerian corporation not
only demands prudent and efficient use of scarce resources; it also
demonstrates the need to develop a proactive insolvency regime to
instill confidence in corporate lenders. These factors have to be
taken into consideration in fashioning a corporate reorganization
regime that is best suited to local circumstances.
128 TUNDE OBADINA, Nigeria's Economy at the Crossroads: New Government Faces
a Legacy of Mismanagement and Decay, AFRICA RECOVERY, UNITED NATIONS, June
1999, at 13, 14, available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/subjindx/
subpdfs/13 1 nigr.pdf; see also FARRAR, supra note 9, at 523 ("Small firms are at a greater
disadvantage than larger firms in raising finance. External equity finance is difficult to
find .... Loan capital is more expensive and the security requirements are more
onerous.").
129 The Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (No. 25) § 20(1)(b) (1991)
provides,
A bank shall not, without prior approval in writing of the [Central Bank of
Nigeria], grant... any unsecured advances, loans or credit facilities unless
authorized in accordance with the bank's rules and regulations and where any
such rules and regulations require adequate security, such security shall be
provided or, as the case may require, deposited with the bank.
Even more profound is the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices
in Banks Act (No. 18) § 19(1)(a) (1994) which provides that
any director, manager, officer or employee of a bank who knowingly,
recklessly, negligently or willfully or otherwise grants, approves or otherwise
connected with the grant or approval of any credit facility without adequate
security or with no security as normally required, or with a defective security, or
without perfecting a security is guilty of an offense punishable with five years
imprisonment without an option of fine.
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B. A Word on Alternative Regimes
Depending on whether rescue or recovery of debt is the
objective, there are some other options open to creditors and
members of a distressed company, such as putting the company
into liquidation or receivership or merging it with another
company. Suffice it to say at this point that these options should
not be viewed as substitute regimes, but rather as alternative
regimes. According to David Brown, one of the goals of corporate
insolvency law should be to provide "a 'menu' of procedures from
which creditors, directors and others and/or the court can
select."' O3 In analyzing these procedures, it is essential to consider
the extent to which they reinforce the individual strengths and
weaknesses of one another.
1. Receivership
A receiver of any property of a company is a person appointed
by the court or pursuant to a power under a debt instrument
(debenture), to take possession of and protect the property, receive
the rents and profits, recover the interest due and discharge all
ascertained outgoings. But, unless he is also appointed as a
manager, he will not have any power to manage the property, in
the sense of buying and selling or carrying on the debtor's
business. 3 ' The terms of a debenture usually spell out the
circumstances in which a receiver or manager can be appointed.
If, for instance, the principal amount borrowed, or the interest
thereof, is in arrears or the security or other assets of the company
are at risk, a receiver or manager may be appointed under standard
terms. 32 Another standard term is that a demand for repayment has
not been met.
As from the date of appointment of a receiver or manager, the
powers of the directors to deal with the property or undertaking
over which he is appointed will cease until such time as he is
discharged.'33 Whereas a receiver or manager appointed by the
130 BROWN 1996, supra note 24, at 17.
131 CAMA § 393; see also In re Manchester and Milford Ry. Co., 14 Ch. D. 645,
653 (1880) (Eng.).
132 See id. § 389 on grounds for appointment by the court.
133 Id. § 393(4). The powers of liquidators in a members' voluntary winding up
shall also cease until the receiver or manager is discharged. Id.
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court is deemed to be an officer of the court, a receiver or manager
appointed out of court is deemed to be an agent of the person or
persons on whose behalf he is appointed.134 A manager of the
whole or any part of the undertaking of a company stands in a
fiduciary relationship to the company and is obliged to act in its
best interests as a whole so as to preserve its assets, further its
business, and promote the purposes for which it was formed.'35 A
receiver is also bound by prior encumbrances over the property he
is to administer.
36
One advantage of receivership is the fact that heavy reliance on
the court for direction or guidance is absent. The freedom given to
parties to determine the modus operandi unclogs the whole system
and ensures that the procedure is a speedy one. In addition,
because a receiver or manager "has the power to step into the
shoes of the directors and continue to manage the business of the
company as a going concern,"'37 receivership holds a measure of
attraction as a rescue device. It also allows creditors to take
immediate steps to ensure that their exposure is not increased after
an initial default.
There are, however, quite a number of demerits. First, any
rescue agenda is greatly undermined by the fact that a receiver
(appointed out of court) is an agent of the person or persons on
whose behalf he is appointed. It goes without saying that it is to
this person or persons, and not the company, that he owes his
allegiance.
Second, the procedure is often a forerunner to liquidation in at
least two senses: (a) as a practical matter, the receiver will often
not realize sufficient funds to pay his appointer in full and the
company will proceed to liquidation; and (b) the appointment of a
receiver does not impose a moratorium on other creditors and in
fact may act as a catalyst galvanizing them into action by putting
the company into liquidation.'38
Third, in spite of the extensive powers given to a receiver or
134 Id. §§ 389(2), 390(1).
135 Id. § 390(2). The test for determining what is "in the best interests of the
company" is a subjective one.
136 Id. § 393(l).
137 BROWN 1996, supra note 24, at 20.
138 FARRAR, supra note 22, at 663-64.
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manager under the CAMA,' 39 he has no power to investigate any
allegations of fraud, incompetence, mismanagement or irregularity
in the management of the affairs of the debtor company."n In cases
where such information is needed to facilitate the process of
rescue, a serious handicap may indeed be occasioned by the
omission.
Finally, the irrepressible issue of cost must be mentioned. By
and large, it is the company's responsibility to pay for the costs of
appointing a receiver though it is possible to make an application
to the court to fix the amount to be paid by way of remuneration to
the receiver.'41 A 1997 survey of forty-three small business
receiverships carried out in New Zealand concluded the direct
costs of receivership were approximately 23.5% of receivership
proceeds.42 An English Judge surmised the whole situation in the
following words:
Having... set out the figures objectively I cannot escape
saying that I find them profoundly shocking. If the
amounts claimed are allowed in full, this receivership will
have produced substantial rewards for the receivers and
their lawyers and nothing at all for the creditors of the
estate. I find it shameful that a court receivership should
produce this result .... 143
In conclusion, receivership remains an attractive option for
companies with a small number of creditors - especially secured
creditors. However, with the exception of liquidation, it holds the
least attraction as a rescue mechanism because its primary purpose
is the management of property with a view to the beneficial
realization of the security of those on whose behalf the receiver is
appointed. 'an This statutorily created agency certainly makes it
139 See CAMA § 393. See also CAMA sched. 11 (entitled "Powers of Receivers
and Managers of the Whole or Substantially the Whole of Company's Property").
140 See CAMA § 393. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2000).
141 See CAMA § 395(1).
142 See Ed Vos & Philippa Webber, Impact of Receivership Costs on the Optimal
Capital Structure for Small Businesses, at http://www.sbaer.uca.edu/Research/
1999/ICSB/99ics227.htm (1997) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International
Law and Commercial Regulation).
143 Mirror Group Newspapers v. Maxwell (No. 2), [1998] 1 B.C.L.C. 638, 645
(1998).
144 See CAMA § 393(2).
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difficult for the receiver to serve two masters - his principal and
the company - at the same time.
2. Liquidation
One key distinguishing factor between liquidation and
receivership is that, unlike his counterpart in liquidation, a receiver
is under no obligation to act for the general body of creditors.
Liquidation is the legal process of winding up the affairs of a
company through the realization of its assets to discharge its
liabilities and the distribution of any surplus to the shareholders. It
is a "means of ending the legal life of [a] company." '145 While it is
true that liquidation leads to the death of a company, it should be
noted that it does not always entail the death of its business.
Section 425(2)(a) of the CAMA vests the liquidator of a company
with the power to sell the business as a going concern. 146
There are basically two modes of winding up: compulsory and
voluntary. 147 In the former, creditors and members (referred to as
contributories) are able to present a petition to the court for the
winding up of a company on grounds, inter alia, of inability of the
company to pay its debts. 4 8 On the other hand, a company may be
wound up voluntarily upon the passing of a resolution to that
effect. 149 In addition, depending on whether the company is solvent
or insolvent, the winding up could be either a member's voluntary
winding up or a creditor's voluntary winding up. 50
Following the appointment of a liquidator, all the powers of
145 ASOMUGHA, supra note 71, at 377.
146 CAMA § 425(2)(a); see also CAMA § 481(1)(b).
147 See id. § 401(1). Section 401 provides for three modes: winding up by the court
or compulsory winding up; voluntary winding up; and winding up subject to the
supervision of the court. The third mode is essentially a winding up which begins
voluntarily, but ends up being supervised by the court. See id.
148 See id. § 408(d). Other grounds for compulsory winding up are where: (a) a
special resolution that the company be wound up is passed; (b) default is made in
delivering the statutory report or in holding the statutory meeting; (c) the number of
members is reduced below two; and (d) the court is of the opinion that it is just and
equitable that the company should be wound up. See id.
149 See id. § 457. If the articles provide that the company shall be dissolved upon
the expiration of a fixed period of time or on the happening of a specific event, an
ordinary resolution will suffice after the period has expired or the event occurred. In all
other cases, a special resolution is required. Id
150 See id. § 462.
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the directors will cease and the liquidator will then become vested
with the power to carry on the business of the company so far as
may be necessary for its beneficial winding up. 5' Quite often, the
liquidator is paid a percentage of the liquidation proceeds, the cost
of which is borne by the liquidating company. In view of the
provisions of section 494, certain preferential payments - such as
income tax deductions, wages, or salary of any employee for
services rendered to the company, and accrued compensation for
injuries suffered in the course of employment by workmen - have
to be made before there can be any repayment of a debt.1
52
Liquidation is hardly considered to be a rescue procedure.
Indeed, it has the exact opposite effect. Vis-A-vis other insolvency
procedures, its main limitation is that as a result of the stigma
society attaches to firms being wound up, it leads to systematic
"under-pricing" of the assets of those firms.' Hence, whether the
assets are sold off piecemeal or as a going concern, the tendency is
that they will be grossly undervalued. Another major disadvantage
of liquidation is that it gobbles up a sizeable portion of the
liquidation proceeds as administrative expenses. Needless to say,
the procedure is unduly elaborate under the present scheme. It
involves a number of court applications as well as the convening
of several general meetings of members and/or creditors.
Nevertheless, liquidation continues to be the only sensible
option for companies that are hopelessly insolvent. Rather than
allow such companies to become a burden to society, liquidation
offers creditors (whether secured or unsecured) an opportunity to
intervene in order to minimize their losses and maximize their
returns. Not to be left out is the power of a liquidator to
investigate offences of fraud committed by officers (both past and
present) within twelve months of the commencement of winding
up and thereafter. 54 Yet another advantage of liquidation is the
moratorium it provides against other enforcement actions by
151 See id. § 425(1)(b); see also id. § 489(2).
152 CAMA § 494.
153 Concealment of the fact that it is undergoing liquidation is not an option: section
512 of the CAMA provides that where a company is being wound up, every invoice,
order for goods or business letter issued by or on behalf of the company, being a
document on or in which the name of the company appears, shall contain a statement that
the company is being wound up. Failure to comply constitutes a criminal offence.
154 See id. §§ 502, 508(2).
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creditors, thereby preventing a race to the courthouse syndrome.'55
3. Mergers andAcquisitions
A distressed company could also merge with or be acquired by
another company. A merger is an "amalgamation of the
undertakings or any part of the undertakings or interest of two or
more companies., 15 6 This wide definition appears to include a
"take-over," the acquisition by one company (bidder) of sufficient
shares in another company (target) to give the bidder control over
the target.1 57 It seems that while the term "merger" is used to
denote a friendly acquisition, a "take-over" often implies a hostile
or unilateral acquisition. This aspect of corporate reorganization is
regulated largely by the Investments and Securities Act of 1999
(ISA).
Under Nigerian law, the following are the legal vehicles for
effecting a merger or take-over: (a) private treaty for the sale of
control blocks; (b) reconstructions under section 538 of the
CAMA involving the voluntary winding up of a company
followed by a transfer of its business to another company; (c)
reconstructions involving a scheme of arrangement (under section
539 of the CAMA) which must be approved by the shareholders of
each of the merging companies; 58 (d) reconstructions in pursuance
of a compromise or arrangement under section 100 of the ISA; (e)
stock market purchases; and (f) take-over bids as regulated by
sections 103 to 122 of the ISA.159
One question is - what does any company stand to gain by
merging with or acquiring another company in distress? The
answer lies in the possible existence of operating, financial, and
managerial synergy gains which may arise from economies of
scale and scope.16 ° The product/market-portfolio model developed
155 See id. §§ 414,488.
156 Id. § 590 (now repealed). It is curious that this definition of merger was
somehow left out of section 99 of the ISA, the provision that replaced section 590.
157 ISA § 99(1) (1999).
158 See generally In re Lipton of Nigeria Ltd., [1985] FHCLR 113, at 122-23 (Nig.).
159 See TUNDE OGOWEWO, The Market for Corporate Control and the Investments
and Securities Act 1999, THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
LAW OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 4, at 19-30 (2000).
160 On the meaning of these terms, see RONALD GILSON & BERNARD BLACK, THE
LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 268-89 (2d ed. 1995).
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by the Boston Consulting Group gives an insight into how such
synergies can be created. Expounding on the model, Salter and
Weinhold are of the view that there are four business categories,
each having its own pattern of cash generation and use: the Stars
are relatively self-sufficient companies with high cash use and
generation, the Cash Cows are the net providers of cash because
they are only able to use little of the high cash flows they generate
in their low-growth market, the Question Marks are ventures
which require a great deal of cash for investment in a high-growth
market, and the Dogs are non-viable businesses with low cash
generation in a low-growth market.161 The idea is that while it
makes economic sense for a Dog to be liquidated, the cash flow
generated by a Cash Cow could be used to boost the market share
of a Question Mark and possibly turn it into a Star.162
A Cash Cow and a Question Mark will therefore be good
merger candidates provided the former possesses the requisite
"accumulated experience" needed to increase production volumes
at declining costs.'63 The model is certainly more relevant in a
country where the capital market is relatively undeveloped (like
Nigeria) than in a country with a developed capital market which
facilitates the raising of capital at relatively low costs. One major
disadvantage, however, is that it depends on several external
factors beyond the control of a company in distress, such as the
requirement of a high-growth market and the need for participation
by an interested acquiring Cash Cow with accumulated
experience. With such fortuitous preconditions, successful
mergers and acquisitions will turn out to be more of an exception
than the rule itself.
C. Two-Pronged Approach
This paper seeks the introduction of an alternative approach to
161 MALCOLM SALTER & WOLF WEINHOLD, DIVERSIFICATION THROUGH
ACQUISITION: STRATEGIES FOR CREATING ECONOMIC VALUES 65-78 (1979).
162 Id.
163 See id. at 66-67. "Accumulated experience" encompasses knowledge relating to:
(1) labor efficiency; (2) new processes and improved methods; (3) product redesign that
conserves material, allows greater efficiency in manufacture, and takes advantage of less
costly resources; (4) product standardization; and (5) scale effects. Cash generation is
said to be a function of accumulated experience, while cash use is a function of market
growth. Id. at 67.
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corporation reorganization in Nigeria. As stated in the
introductory part, the underlying principles (of efficiency and
equity) behind the new approach are: (a) the creation of an
enabling environment for the development of an optimal
reorganization plan that maximizes the chances of an insolvent (or
nearly insolvent) company, or as much as possible of its business,
successfully continuing in existence; and (b) the fair treatment of
all the parties directly affected by the plan.' 64  The efficiency
question is addressed from the perspective of both ex ante and ex
post consequences of the reorganization process. The most
fundamental expression of the efficiency principle is that
reorganization should be pursued if and only if the value of the
reorganized firm will be greater than the value of the firm if
liquidated. Where this is not the case, other options such as
liquidation should be considered. In addition to the need to
maximize the size of the pie, the requirement of fair treatment is
imposed in order to ensure the equitable treatment of all parties.
This element has ex ante effects on the ability to attract capital.
According to Lucian Bebchuk, in order to maximize the total
value of the company's assets ex post, it is desirable that as little
value as possible is dissipated during the reorganization process
and that the company's assets are allocated to their highest-valued
use.'65 Mark Roe has also suggested three principal characteristics
desirable for a reorganization mechanism: speed, low cost, and a
resulting sound capital structure. 166 Consequently, any alternative
procedure should be as short and inexpensive as possible,
particularly in light of the relatively small size of the purse of most
Nigerian companies. Overly elaborate and expensive procedures
will probably be shunned by these companies and explain why the
rescue procedure is rather unpopular at the moment. A company
undergoing reorganization should also emerge with the least
burdensome capital structure.
Other hallmarks of a good corporate reorganization regime are
certainty and fairness. In its report, the Cork Committee stated
that one of the aims of modern insolvency law is the distribution
164 Cf Corporations Act of 2001, Pt. 5.3A, § 435A(a) (Austl.).
165 See LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK Pt. 11, at 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 6473, March 1998).
166 MARK J. ROE, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate
Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 529 (1983).
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of proceeds amongst creditors in a fair and equitable manner,
returning any surplus to the debtor (company and shareholders).'67
Admittedly, the notion of fairness is quite elusive. It entails doing
what is just and equitable ex post, that is, at the point of
reorganization. For instance, the process would indeed be unfair if
certain classes are made much better off at the expense of others
who end up worse off. Matters of certainty and fair treatment are
given considerable weight by investors in deciding whether or not
to part with their funds and, therefore, have significant ex ante
implications. Without doubt, a system which guarantees members
and creditors greater control over the whole reorganization process
will go a long way in satisfying these goals.
In view of the foregoing, this paper shall take the following
position: creditors and shareholders should be given the autonomy
to decide the fate of their investment with as little outside
interference and as much predictability as possible. Indeed, this
should always be the case so long as the process of decision-
making is an informed one. This means that each individual
creditor or shareholder must be made to understand not only the
effect of a proposed plan of reorganization, but also the underlying
interests, motives, and concerns of all the other parties. A direct
consequence of this increased ability to exercise considerable ex
post control over the state of affairs of a distressed company is that
many investors will more readily be swayed into parting with their
funds. Such a regime will foster greater cooperation between
creditors and debtor companies with the overall objective of
facilitating corporate turnaround. How does the present regime
fare under these standards? Not very well.
D. Cost Problems
The last thing an insolvent company has to throw around is
money, the lack of which is the reason for its insolvency in the first
place. At this stage in the life of any company, prudent and
justifiable spending is (or should be) the order of the day.
Undergoing reorganization will only make sense if more value can
be generated through the process than through liquidation. In
computing the excess value, both direct and indirect costs of
reorganization have to be taken into account. Reorganization
167 See CORK CoMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 16, Pt. 4.
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becomes an undesirable option when such costs exceed the
potential benefits. Research has shown that these bankruptcy costs
are more significant for small companies than large ones.168 From
this cost analysis perspective, it is easy to see why, despite over
thirty-five years of existence, arrangements and compromise
continue to be a redundant area of corporate law in Nigeria.
Prominent on the list of expenditures are expenses involving
two court hearings and engagement of outside counsel and the
convening of the court-ordered meeting or meetings. These
expenses could easily run into millions of Naira or other amounts
beyond the reach of small companies in financial distress. At least
one writer has questioned the need for a first application to court,
describing it as "unnecessary and wasteful." '169 Others have leveled
criticisms on the "high degree of court control, especially as much
of this is 'rubber-stamping."" ' 7 In order to realize the objectives of
rescue, a balance has to be struck between the need to have an
inexpensive procedure and the need for supervision by a
competent authority (e.g. a court or an insolvency expert), both of
which are relevant from efficiency and fairness perspectives.
While it is desirable to minimize costs by limiting the level of
outside interference, there is a lot to be said in favor of an
independent body which acts as a check to ensure that values are
maximized and parties are accorded fair treatment.
E. Speed
More mature jurisdictions have long discovered that the
scheme of arrangement procedure is unsuitable for small
companies and that "by no stretch of the imagination could [it] be
said to represent an emergency response to a company in
distress."'' Speed in this sense entails not only prompt treatment,
168 See VOS & WEBBER, supra note 142.
169 ASOMUGHA, supra note 71, at 411. Even though the learned author made this
criticism in the specific context of arrangements and compromise proposed for the
merger of companies, his reasoning also commends itself to the present discourse.
170 BROWN 1996, supra note 24, at 641; see also CORK COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 16, Pt. 7.
171 Milman, supra note 8, at 416. See also TOMASIC & BOTrOMLEY, supra note 35,
at 160. US Federal legislators were particularly concerned about "the patient [dying] on
the operating table while the lawyers are diagnosing." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 229
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6189.
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but also early diagnosis; not only timely cure, but also prevention.
The procedure fails on both scores. It requires a company to be
insolvent (or in liquidation) in order to take (dis)advantage of its
provisions. Apart from being counter-intuitive, this requirement is
bound to produce some inefficiencies. Under such a system, the
board of a solvent company in financial difficulty is denied the
ability to act quickly to prevent a further shrinking of the pie.
From conception to approval by the court, a scheme of
arrangement could easily take a period of up to one year. Some of
the activities that will be carried out within this timeframe are: (a)
preparation of an explanatory statement on the proposed scheme;
(b) an application to court for an order convening the statutory
meeting or meetings;172 (c) preparation and sending out of meeting
notices together with the explanatory statement; (d) holding of the
meeting or meetings; (e) a second application to the court for
approval of the scheme; (e) reference by the court to the SEC on
issues of fairness; (f) investigation of fairness of the scheme by
SEC appointed inspectors and submission of written report thereon
to court; and (g) approval of the scheme by the court and the
subsequent registration of a copy of the court order at the CAC.
It is no secret that proceedings before Nigerian courts are
usually long and protracted. Relatively simple applications may
take months to complete, while more complex cases (particularly
contested cases) normally last for years. Administrative
proceedings conducted by the SEC may well aggravate the
situation. 17 3 During the period prior to approval, the whole future
of the company is uncertain and new business opportunities are
likely to be lost. Even more significant is the fact that the
company is unable to concentrate on its existing businesses, and
efforts to raise additional capital usually end up being frustrated.
When coupled with other problems associated with the absence of
a moratorium,174 a decision to embark on this journey often
signifies an intention to dissolve the company.
In a nutshell, the longer it takes a company to reorganize the
172 In Andruchue, this application alone took nearly three months to complete.
[1994] FHCLR 51.
173 This writer is not aware of any investigation that has actually been carried out by
the SEC.
174 To be discussed in section 3.6.
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more it loses in terms of business expansion opportunities, capable
personnel, goodwill and capital. Of course, the foregoing should
not be taken as suggesting a need to sacrifice fairness at the altar
of speed - all in the bid to maximize efficiency. As much as
possible, a proposed plan should not only reflect the will of all
stakeholders, it should also be a product of their informed consent.
Limited supervision by the court or by a competent expert is also
desirable to facilitate timely resolution of potential disputes and
prevent irreversible value destruction.
F. Moratorium Issues
One of the most delicate issues in any insolvency regime
involves having to make a decision between two major concerns -
the protection of a debtor from harassment and undue demands by
creditors on the one hand, and recognition and enforcement of the
rights of creditors (whose position may be at risk) on the other
hand. A major flaw in the present system is the non-availability of
a moratorium during negotiations prior to the time of the first court
application. Indeed, the cases are clear on the point that a
unilateral proposal made to the court by a debtor company falls
outside the definition of a 'compromise or arrangement' as used in
section 539 of the CAMA.'75 As a result, debtor companies are
denied that element of surprise and protection necessary to prevent
a floodgate of enforcement actions (including a petition that the
company be wound up) by creditors during negotiations.
A 1988 report of the Australian Law Reform Commission
states that:
A constructive approach to corporate insolvency requires
the preservation, if practical and possible, of the property
and business of the company in the brief period before
creditors are in a position to make an informed decision.
This assists in an orderly and beneficial administration
whether creditors decide to wind the company up or accept
a compromise. 17 6
175 See Andruchue, [1994] FHCLR 51; In re Interfirst Fin. & Sec. Ltd. [1993]
FHCLR 421. Also recall from Pt. Two that it is only at the time of the order convening
the statutory meeting or meetings that an order of moratorium may also be granted.
176 AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, GENERAL INSOLVENCY INQUIRY para.
53 (1988).
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However, deciding to put in place a moratorium is only the
beginning; the duration and width of the moratorium are other
pertinent considerations. These issues will be discussed in the
final part.
Without directly saying that the presence of a moratorium is
always value-maximizing, one may categorically assert that, on the
whole, the complete absence of it is bound to be inefficient. It
allows unscrupulous creditors to extract value from the company
at a time when it requires breathing space to map out a
comprehensive plan of recovery. Moreover, if a few creditors are
able to recover their claims outside liquidation, others will
invariably be left with a disproportionate size of the company's
pie. The problem is real because not all creditors are sophisticated
enough to know how to act punctually under these circumstances.
A moratorium should therefore be seen as a cooling off period
during which time a distressed company is afforded the
opportunity to ensure the fair treatment of all claimants and
prevent value losses occasioned by panic generated among
creditors of the company.
G. Control of the Company and Reorganization Process
While control of the company remains in the hands of existing
management (or the liquidator) under the current system,
supervisory control over the scheme is exercised primarily by the
court. At the onset, it should be noted that this is just one blend of
a number of control options open to policy makers. Apart from
the debtor-in-possession model, it is also possible to have an
independent set of directors take charge of the affairs of the
company or to establish a committee of creditors with power to
shape decision-making by the board. Alongside this issue of who
manages the company is the complementary question of authority
to control the process, a power which may be vested in any of the
following: the debtor company, a professional insolvency expert
(scheme administrator), or the court.
These two aspects of control are not mutually exclusive and
they both touch upon the all-important issue of competence. In
order to take advantage of some of the benefits of reorganization,
it is desirable to have competent persons at the critical stages of
the process - specifically the proposal, approval, and
implementation stages. It is undeniable that the separation of
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powers (between the debtor company and the court) under section
539 of the CAMA is justifiable in light of the potential for abuse
by management if the powers were to be concentrated in the
debtor. However, the question is whether there can be a more
efficient separation.
The quality of supervision undertaken by the court is rather
doubtful for the simple reason that judges are not businessmen.
They are limited by the information provided to them and lack the
expertise to give a knowledgeable decision as to the feasibility and
fairness of a proposed scheme.'77 Equally questionable is the role
of the SEC in insolvency matters, an area which falls outside the
Commission's ordinary scope of competence.'78 Besides, it is not
unlikely that creditors may feel quite disenchanted at the point at
which the court relinquishes control over the process to the debtor
company - that is, after approval. At the stage of implementation,
creditors have no way of monitoring the progress - or otherwise -
of the scheme as approved and cannot take any 'preventive' action
until there is default. Hence, what is paramount is a system of
adequate checks and balances though, by way of caution, "[i]t
should not be assumed that there will be widespread abuse simply
because no outside professional takes control."'79
H. Fairness
This section will consider the question of whether the existing
reorganization regime guarantees the fair treatment of all
stakeholders and will touch upon the related problem of how the
fairness of a scheme is determined under the Act. As explained
above, these issues have significant impact on the ability of a
company to attract capital.
An ongoing struggle between measures put in place to prevent
inefficient holdouts and those meant to ensure class autonomy in
the decision as to whether or not members of a particular class
should be bound by a scheme has led some commentators to
177 The Nigerian Law Reform Commission also concluded that the courts "lack the
necessary economic and accounting skills" to determine to any degree of exactness
whether a scheme is actually fair or not. NIGERIAN COMPANY REPORT, supra note 1, at
244.
178 This is discussed further in section 3.8.
179 BROWN 1996, supra note 24, at 46.
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question the veto power held by shareholders as a class."8° The
argument often advanced is that shareholders of an insolvent
company have no tangible interest in its assets and should
therefore not have any say in the asset distribution. There are,
however, two reasons why this argument is not particularly
persuasive. First, it is possible, albeit improbable, to exclude a
class of shareholders from voting upon proof that its members are
not entitled to anything under an arrangement which also
contemplates liquidation, because the assets of the company are
insufficient to satisfy all claims. 8' A second and more intuitive
reason is that shareholders will, as a matter of fact, scarcely use the
veto power unless it is value-maximizing to do so, because other
alternatives to reorganization (possibly with the exception of a
merger) hardly serve their interests.
There are more pressing concerns with the Act's voting
requirements. The requirement of "being present and voting" fails
to take into account the possibility that some claimants with
relatively small claims may, in weighing the costs and benefits of
attending the meeting, rationally decide against attending it.
While there may indeed be other valid reasons for not attending
the meeting, the Act fails to take any of these into consideration,
and instead, creates a loophole which could result in a class vote
not being a fair representation of the interests of the class taken as
a whole. Even more egregious is the voting distortion generated
by the votes of related or interested persons 8 ' and the absence of a
rule excluding such votes. As noted above, a scheme takes effect
as to bind all members within a class, whether or not they voted
for its approval, and dissenting security holders have nothing (by
way of appraisal remedy) to fall back on when the scheme is
eventually sanctioned by the court.
In an attempt to develop a safety net for the protection of
minority interests, a court will refuse to sanction a scheme on
grounds of lack of fairness if it finds that the majority resolution
180 See Milman, supra note 8, at 425.
181 This course of action involves ascertaining the reorganization value of the
company together with all the undesirable consequences associated with its division. See
e.g., Mark J. Roe, supra note 166; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate
Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REv. 775 (1988).
182 That is, persons with significant interests in two or more classes or insiders with
security interests.
20031
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
was not arrived at in good faith. 183 This brings the process of
establishing the fairness of a scheme under the spotlight and, in
particular, calls for greater scrutiny of the role of the SEC in this
regard. It has been mentioned elsewhere in this paper that the SEC
is not an appropriate body of reference for questions of fairness.
There are a number of reasons for this assertion. Matters
involving corporate insolvency or bankruptcy traditionally have
been handled by the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) rather
than the SEC. As a matter of fact, in the company law reform
proposals, the CAC was originally put forward as the body to be
responsible for deciding these questions of fairness.'84
It is not surprising that all the rules and regulations made by
the SEC fail to provide any form of guidance "as to the substantive
and adjectival law surrounding [schemes of arrangement]."' 85 The
way things are, the Commission appears to be in danger of
erroneously applying standards normally used for the approval of
mergers and acquisitions to transactions limited to internal
restructuring in distressed companies. The inevitable conclusion is
that fair treatment of all stakeholders is not guaranteed under the
existing regime.
IV. A Mediation-Based Approach
A. Introduction
On a spectrum between two extremes - informal, out-of-court
arrangements on one hand and the existing formal court-
sanctioned schemes of arrangement on the other hand - the new
approach falls somewhere in the middle. It relies a great deal on
mediation and seeks to give the parties considerable discretion in
determining the outcome of an arrangement with minimal court
involvement. Without compromising on the objective of fair
treatment, it is built on the principles of value maximization and
party autonomy. It also addresses some of the problematic areas
183 See In re Cheseborough Prod. Indus. Ltd. Suit No. FHC/L/M49/88
(Unreported); In re Anglo-Cont'l Supply Co., [1922] 2 Ch. 723, 736.
184 See THE NIGERIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, 1 THE REFORM OF NIGERIAN
COMPANY LAW - REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 314 (1987). No reasons have been
given for the change from the CAC to the SEC.
185 BROWN 1996, supra note 24, at 642.
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identified in the preceding part through the introduction of a
moratorium for a specific period and the provision of a fallback
remedy for dissenting class members.
By way of introduction, mediation may be defined as a process
in which a neutral third party (the mediator) is employed to
facilitate communication between negotiating parties in an effort
to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. 8 6 It is usually referred
to as the "sleeping giant" of business dispute resolution with,
potentially, the most powerful means of bringing the parties to
terms.'87 Its main focus is not on reconciling positions but on
reconciling interests. As one writer put it, "mediation is informal,
voluntary, forward-looking, cooperative and interest-based. A
mediator helps willing parties craft an agreement that looks to the
future, satisfies their needs, and meets their own standards of
fairness." '88 In this model, the mediator should ideally be an
insolvency expert or practitioner while the negotiating parties are
the different classes of creditors and shareholders and the debtor
company.
The design of the new approach is not radically different from
the existing system, the beneficial aspects of which are still
relevant. In particular, the debtor-in-possession model is to be
retained since small companies usually (or arguably) require firm-
specific skills rather than generalized skills which are better suited
to larger companies. In this sense, therefore, it is more intuitive
for an existing management team to remain in control of a
distressed company while the company attempts to ride the tide of
the insolvency wave. However, proposed changes will permit
deviations in deserving cases, such as where it is shown that
management lacks the skill and competence to run the company
efficiently, or, if it can be proved, that egregious conduct by
management is likely to lead to further depletion of corporate
assets.
Recently, proposals for the reform of this area of the law in
186 See BENNETT G. PICKER, MEDIATION PRACTICE GUIDE: A HANDBOOK FOR
RESOLVING BusINESS DISPUTES 2 (1998).
187 JAMES F. HENRY & JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE MANAGER'S GUIDE TO
RESOLVING LEGAL DISPUTES 57 (1985).
188 GARY GOODPASTER, A GUIDE TO NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION 204 (1997).
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other jurisdictions have become rather common. 8 9 Countries are
increasingly placing greater emphasis on the rehabilitation or
rescue of distressed companies. While the search for the most
effective corporate rescue regime continues, some comparative
insights will provide a useful background to some of the features
in the new approach.
B. United Kingdom
It all started with the Cork Committee on Insolvency Law and
Practice, which first proposed the introduction of a corporate
rescue regime for distressed companies in the United Kingdom
and heralded the passing of the Insolvency Act of 1986.190 Under
the Act, a company contemplating rehabilitation may take
advantage of two different but complementary procedures.' 9' The
first is the company voluntary arrangement (CVA) regime and the
second is the administrative order procedure.' 92 Initially, though, it
should be noted that this new regime exists side by side with the
traditional schemes of arrangement under section 425 of the
Companies Act of 1985'9' and that in spite of its short title, the Act
is not restricted to insolvent companies.
A CVA begins with the directors of a distressed company
which is not in administration 94 or liquidation making a proposal
to the company and its creditors for a composition in satisfaction
of its debts or a scheme of arrangement of its affairs (both
collectively referred to as "voluntary arrangements"). 195 The
proposal must provide for a qualified insolvency practitioner (the
nominee) to act either as a trustee or a supervisor in relation to the
voluntary arrangement. 96 Within twenty-eight days after he is
given the proposal, the nominee is required to submit a report to
189 See e.g., Milman, supra note 8, at 415; COMPANY LAW REVIEW, supra note 68,
at 275; NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY
YEARS - NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION FINAL REPORT (1997).
190 Insolvency Act, 1986 (Eng.).
191 See id.
192 See id.
193 This is almost identical to part XVI of the CAMA.
194 That is, the administration order under part I1 of the Insolvency Act of 1986 is
not in force in relation to the company.
195 Insolvency Act, 1986 cl. 1, § 1 (Eng.).
196 Id.
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the court as to the desirability and/or mode of summoning
meetings of the company and of its creditors.'97 If the voluntary
arrangement is approved by the requisite majority at the meetings,
it will bind all the creditors who had notice of and were entitled to
vote at the meetings, whether or not they were present or
represented.'98 Unless an administration order is also sought, the
CVA does not contemplate the imposition of a moratorium.'
99
An application challenging the voluntary arrangement may be
made to the court on two grounds: (a) that the approved
arrangement unfairly prejudices the interest of a creditor, member
or contributory of the company; or (b) that there has been some
material irregularity at or in relation to the meetings. This
application must be made within twenty-eight days after the
making of a report of the meetings to the court. It may be made by
any person entitled to vote at the meetings or by the nominee.200 In
implementing the arrangement, the directors are to be supervised
by the nominee (now referred to as the supervisor) who has the
power to apply to the court for directions or for an administration
order or to petition for the winding up of the company.2"'
However, the directors continue to be responsible for the day-to-
202day management of the affairs of the company.
In contrast, the administration order procedure involves greater
court participation. An administration order is defined under
section 8(2) of the 1986 Act as "an order directing that, during the
period for which the order is in force, the affairs, business and
property of the company shall be managed by a person ('the
197 Id. § 2.
198 Id. § 4(1). However, by sections 4(3) and 4(4), voters at the meetings lack the
power to approve a proposal or modification which affects the rights of secured or
preferential creditors, except with their concurrence.
199 Sections 10 and I 1 of Part II of the Act provides expressly for what amounts to a
moratorium in the case of Administration orders, but there is no equivalent provision for
CVAs in Part I of the Act. In such cases, one may adopt the canon of statutory
interpretation to the effect that a fight (or power) not expressly conferred should not be
inferred.
200 Id. § 6.
201 Id. § 7.
202 The "supervisor" mentioned in section 7 of Part I of the Act is not vested with the
powers of managing the affairs of the company except insofar as it relates to carrying out
the voluntary arrangement. Moreover, it is not contemplated that the directors be
replaced in this scenario.
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administrator') appointed for the purpose by the court." 203 The
order may be used as a means for achieving several purposes,
including: the sanctioning of a scheme of arrangement under
section 425 of the Companies Act of 1985; the realization of the
company's assets in a way more advantageous than liquidation;
and the approval of a voluntary arrangement under Part 1.204 The
procedure can be initiated by the company, its directors or
creditors filing a petition in court.2 °5
The effect of the petition and order gives the procedure its
uniqueness. Upon presentation of the petition and until the
making of the order sought or dismissal of the petition, a
moratorium preventing the institution of enforcement proceedings
including a winding up petition against the company is imposed
unless the court otherwise permits. 20 6 The moratorium is
automatically terminated if the petition is eventually dismissed.20 7
If the order is made, however, the moratorium stays in force and
may not be lifted unless either the administrator or the court
consents to it. The administrator has more extensive powers than
the supervisor under Part I and it is not uncommon for him to take
charge of managing the day-to-day affairs of the company.
Realizing that, due to court costs and professional
involvement, the procedure outlined above could still prove to be
too expensive for small companies; 2 8 hence, the Insolvency Act of
2000 was passed. Under this Act, a debtor company becomes
immediately entitled to a moratorium in support of a CVA upon
the filing of certain documents in court (without the need for an
order of court or a court-appointed administrator). 20 9 The
significance of this is that incumbent directors remain in control
while the company is availed the protection. However, the facility
203 Id. § 8(2).
204 Id. § 8(3).
205 Id. § 9(1).
206 Id. § 10(1).
207 Id.
208 In order for a debtor company contemplating rescue or rehabilitation to avail
itself of the moratorium, the CVA model needs to be combined with the administration
order procedure. This involves an application to the court with adequate supporting
financial documentation attested to by an independent expert. It is this combination that
small companies may find expensive. See Milman, supra note 8, at 423-24.
209 Insolvency Act of 2001, § 1 (Eng.). See id. sched. 1.
[Vol. 29
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS IN NIGERIA
is only available to companies which satisfy two or more of the
requirements for being a "small company" under section 247(3) of
the Companies Act of 1985.21°
Within the Nigerian context, the English procedure
(particularly under the Insolvency Act of 2000) will score fairly
high on an efficiency scorecard because it removes the need for
extensive court involvement and quickens the pace of
restructuring. However, it shows an inclination to move away
from a creditor-oriented model of reorganization without putting
adequate measures in place to guarantee the fair treatment of those
creditors. In particular, it fails to provide a fallback remedy for
dissenting creditors seeing that the outcome of the vote binds all
the creditors.21' Also, as a practical matter, creditors are hardly
given the opportunity to participate in the formulation of the
reorganization plan and their contribution to the restructuring
process is more often than not restricted to the statutory meetings.
While these lapses may not necessarily work any hardship in an
economy where capital is easily and readily available, remedial
steps need to be taken in other economies not only to facilitate ex
ante investment by risk-averse creditors, but also to improve their
propensity to be cooperative ex post should the company become
distressed.
C. Australia
The 1988 Report of the Australian Law Commission titled
"General Insolvency Inquiry, ' '212 and popularly referred to as the
Harmer Report, paved the way for the introduction of the
Voluntary Administration procedure through the enactment of the
Corporate Law Reform Act of 1992. The objective of the new
procedure, as stated in section 435A of the Australian
Corporations Law, is to allow the
business, property and affairs of an insolvent company to
be administered in such a way that: (a) maximizes the
210 The requirements under the subsection are: (a) a turnover of not more than £2.8
million; (b) a balance sheet total of not more than £1.4 million; and (c) not more than
fifty employees. Companies Act of 1985, § 247(3).
211 However, secured creditors cannot be bound without their consent. See
Insolvency Act, § 1.
212 General Insolvency Inquiry, Report of the Australian Law Commission (1988),
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/45.
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chances of the company, or as much as possible of its
business, continuing in existence; or (b) if it is not possible
for the company or its business to continue in existence -
results in a better return for the company's creditors and
members than would result from an immediate winding up
of the company.
2 13
Where the directors of a distressed company are of the opinion
that the company is insolvent or that it is likely to become
insolvent at some time in the near future, they may initiate a
voluntary administration by appointing an administrator who
immediately takes charge of the company's property, business and
affairs. 2 14 The administrator may also be appointed by a liquidator,
provisional liquidator or a chargee entitled to enforce a charge
over the whole or substantially the whole of the company's
property (i.e. secured creditors).2 15 The administrator must be
licensed to practice as a liquidator by the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (ASIC).216 His primary function under
section 438A of the Corporations Law is to investigate the
financial position of the company with a view to making a
recommendation to a meeting of creditors about what should be
done with the company and its business. 17
A twenty-eight day moratorium is automatically triggered by
the appointment of an administrator. Up to this point, there is no
requirement for any application to be made to the court. One
important exception to the moratorium is that the chargee
mentioned above is given an opportunity to appoint a receiver
within fourteen days of the appointment of the administrator. The
administrator takes control subject to the powers of the receiver
appointed under this exception. However, if no receiver is
appointed, the administrator retains full control over the
management of the affairs of the company. He is required to
convene the first meeting of creditors within five business days of
213 Corporations Act of 2001, Pt. 5.3A, § 435A (Austl.).
214 Id. §§ 436A(1)(a), 437A(l)(a).
215 Id. §§ 436B, 436C.
216 Id. § 448B.
217 Andrew Sellars, Corporate Voluntary Administration in Australia (2001),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/36/1873984.pdf (a paper delivered at the
Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform - Insolvency Reform in Asia: An Assessment of the
Recent Developments and the Role of Judiciary in Bali, Indonesia, Feb. 7-8, 2001).
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his appointment.21 At this meeting, the creditors will consider,
inter alia, whether to remove the administrator and appoint
someone else in his place.
After investigating the financial affairs of the company, the
administrator is required, within twenty-eight days of his
appointment, to convene a second meeting of creditors to
determine the company's future. 219 He must provide the creditors
with a statement containing an opinion as to each of the following
three options upon which they may pass a resolution: (a) whether
it would be in the creditors' interests to execute a deed of company
arrangement; (b) whether it would be in the interests of the
creditors for the administration to end; and (c) whether it would be
in the interests of the creditors for the corporation to be wound
up. 22' A vote on a resolution is determined "on the voices" unless a
poll is demanded. If a poll is taken, it must be approved by a
simple majority in number and value of debt owed. The court may
set aside a resolution or order that a meeting be reconvened if it
finds that: (a) the vote would have gone another way if the votes of
related parties are disregarded; and (b) the result of the vote is
contrary to the interests of creditors as a whole, or likely to
prejudice the interests of the creditors who voted the other way.22'
A few problems may arise under the above approach. First,
directors of a distressed company lack the incentive to act quickly
by putting the company in voluntary administration because they
are likely to lose their jobs upon the appointment of an
administrator.222 Secondly, in at least two ways, the success of the
procedure is heavily dependent on securing the cooperation of
secured creditors. An administrator has no power to administer
218 Corporations Act of 2001, § 436E (Austl.).
219 Or within thirty-five days of his appointment where Christmas or Easter
intervenes. See Sellars, supra note 217.
220 Corporations Act of2001, § 439A(4),
221 See generally, Sellars, supra note 217.
222 It should be noted though that directors of an insolvent company may be held
personally liable to pay the tax on the salaries of employees if they delay in putting the
company in voluntary administration or liquidation after the Australian Taxation Office
has issued a notice informing the directors that the company has failed to remit the taxes.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that this penalty ultimately may prove to be ineffective
because it is dependent on a prior default in tax remission - an occurrence which can be
avoided.
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assets under the control of a receiver appointed by a secured
creditor and a deed of company arrangement binds only those
secured creditors who agree to be bound by it. Apparently,
secured creditors are given unrestrained freedom to create
inefficiencies ex post. Finally, a minor criticism relates to the
substantial costs involved in holding, not one, but two meetings of
creditors as mandated by the statute.
D. United States
The corporate reorganization regime in the United States is
contained in Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Section 362
of the Code makes provision for an automatic stay which takes
effect upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition against any person
with a claim against the debtor company, whether or not such
person had prior notice of it. The filing may be voluntary or
involuntary depending on whether it is done by the debtor
company or by creditors. In spite of the stay, the debtor-in-
possession (DIP) remains in control and continues to operate the
business in the ordinary course. The DIP has far-reaching powers,
including the power to assume or to breach outstanding executory
contracts, the power to set aside certain security interests in the
debtor's property, and the power to void fraudulent
conveyances.223
After the initial filing, negotiations between the DIP and major
creditors commence. For this, a creditors' committee is usually
appointed to negotiate on behalf of the creditors. There is a 120-
day exclusivity period within which only the DIP is allowed to file
224
a plan of reorganization. If the plan is approved by the specified
majorities of security holders voting in classes, the court will
confirm it so long as it is feasible. 5 On the request of a party in
223 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 544(a), 547, 548, 544(b) (2003). It should be noted that at any
time after the commencement of the case, but before confirmation of a plan by the
request of a party in interest, the court has the power to order the appointment of a trustee
for cause. This includes fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of
the affairs of the debtor by current management or if such appointment is in the interests
of the creditors and equity holders. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2003).
224 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2003). This period may be reduced on the request of a
party in interest or extended to 180 days if the DIP has proposed a plan that has not yet
been accepted. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)-(d).
225 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(c)-(d), 1129(a)(1 1) (2003).
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interest, the court may discountenance any acceptance or rejection
not made in good faith.226
Unlike the position in the UK and Australia, there is a fall-back
remedy for dissenting security holders under Chapter 11.
Specifically, an individual security holder who votes against a plan
is nevertheless entitled to receive an amount no less than he would
have been entitled to receive in liquidation. 7 Where the plan is
rejected by a class of security holders, it may still be confirmed by
the court if it does not discriminate unfairly and is fair and
equitable with respect to each impaired class of claims or
interests.8 Upon confirmation, the debtor company is discharged
from all of its pre-petition debts except as provided in the
reorganization plan.
The court is empowered by section 1104(c) of the Code to
order the appointment of an examiner if the debtor company's
debts exceed $5 million or if such appointment is in the interests of
the creditors and equity holders - provided no trustee has been
appointed. While the primary duty of a trustee is the management
of corporate assets going forward, the examiner's main task is to
investigate any allegations of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence,
misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in the management of
the affairs of the debtor. It is possible for a DIP or creditor to
convert a Chapter 11 reorganization to a Chapter 7 liquidation.
However, in the case of creditors, sufficient cause must be shown,
such as continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence
of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation, inability to effectuate a
plan, and unreasonable delay that is prejudicial to creditors.229
According to Lucian Bebchuk, "the existing bargaining-based
process appears to fall substantially short of the goal of
maximizing total reorganization value., 23 ° It is time-consuming
and involves substantial administrative and litigation costs in the
form of fees paid to accountants, investment bankers, and lawyers.
226 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (1978).
227 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2003).
228 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2003). This section codifies what is popularly referred to
as the absolute priority rule. It also provides the basis for "cram down" litigation or the
imposition of a plan on a dissenting class by order of court. See id.
229 11 U.S.C. § 11 12(b)(1)-(l0) (2003).
230 BEBCHUK, supra note 165, at 4.
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The degree of court involvement, and accompanying court
discretion is more pronounced in the United States than in any of
the countries mentioned thus far.23' It is no wonder then that the
empirical evidence shows that a large fraction of the companies
emerging out of reorganization go through some form of financial
restructuring within a few years. 2  Moreover, the procedure
undoubtedly favors the debtor company because it is given an
unfair advantage in terms of agenda control and improved
bargaining power which may be used to extract substantial value
from creditors. At least one writer has shown that these ex post
deviations from absolute priority may have some negative effects
on ex ante decisions taken by shareholders.233
E. A Mediation-based Approach
It should be made clear right from the onset that mediation is a
mandatory part of the approach being put forward. This form of
mediation, better known as mandatory mediation, is often
criticized for its disregard of what is regarded by many to be a
fundamental element of mediation - the element of voluntary
participation. After all, there is some wisdom in the saying that
"you can lead a horse to water, but you can't make it drink."
However, in the particular context in which mediation is to be
adopted, the argument loses its force for the following reasons.
First, arrangements and mediation may both properly be described
as negotiation-based processes involving extensive bargaining on
the part of the negotiating parties. The law is clear on the point
that a unilateral or one-sided reorganization plan proposed by a
debtor company does not fall within the definition of an
arrangement or a compromise."' Mediation (or assisted
negotiation as it sometimes called) should therefore be seen as a
close substitute to the negotiation which already forms part of the
reorganization process. Using this line of argument, the response
231 See generally BROWN 1996, supra note 24.
232 E. Hotchkiss, Post-Bankruptcy Performance and Management Turnover, 50 J. OF
FIN. 3, 21 (1995).
233 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in
Bankruptcy, THE HARVARD JOHN M. OLIN DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, Discussion Paper
No. 328, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olincenter/ (2001).
234 In re Interfirst Fin. & Sec. Ltd., [1993] FHCLR 421; Andruchue, [1994] FHCLR
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to the adage would therefore be "you don't need to make a thirsty
horse drink."
Secondly, the mediation-based approach is not meant to
replace the traditional schemes of arrangement but to supplement
the "menu" of rescue procedures already available.135 The
negotiating parties are free to choose whichever procedure they
wish to utilize. The desirability of minimizing the risk of an
imposed outcome and the availability of a fall-back remedy for
persons who refuse to participate in the mediation process also
serve to mitigate any negative consequence of forced participation.
In any case, the only mandatory part is that mediation takes place;
participation is voluntary. Other advantages to be derived from
mediation include confidentiality, speed, reduced costs and the
prospect of preserving continuing relationships.
Another possible objection to a mediation-based approach is
the usual claim by critics that mediation is ineffective in complex,
multiparty cases. According to Edward Morse, the complexity of
the dispute and the opportunity for misunderstanding multiply as
the number of parties increases, "thus erecting greater barriers for
the mediator to help the parties overcome." '236 This is hardly the
case. Generally speaking, multiparty disputes create more room
for generating innovative settlement options. In addition to having
most of the advantages of a mini-trial (without some of the
complications), mediation is flexible enough to be adaptable to
business disputes of all sizes and complexity.237 Mediators vary
according to expertise on different issues, whether substantive or
procedural, with some specializing in complex, multiparty dispute
resolution. It is perhaps safe to say that "mediation in multiparty
suits is particularly effective because it allows each creditor the
opportunity to be heard and to pool resources with other
creditors. 238
235 In the conclusion, various reasons are given in support of the call for the
retention of a modified court-sanctioned approach.
236 See Edward A. Morse, Mediation in Debtor/Creditor Relationships, 20 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 587, 593 (1987).
237 LINDA R. SINGER, SETTLING DISPUTES: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN BUSINESS,
FAMILIES, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 70 (1994).
238 Cassandra G. Mott, Macy's Miracle on 34 h Street: Employing Mediation to
Develop the Reorganization Plan in a Mega-Pt. 11 Case, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 193, 205 (1998).
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1. Initiating the Process and Moratorium Issues
Any company in financial difficulty (irrespective of size)
would qualify to enter into the procedure which could be initiated
either by the debtor company upon a mere declaration or by
creditors after the fulfillment of certain conditions. Where the
directors of a company are of the opinion that the company is
insolvent, or is likely to be insolvent at some time in the near
future, they would be entitled to file for reorganization under the
procedure with the CAC. On their part, creditors would be
required first to establish that the company is unable to pay its
debts before being allowed to file for reorganization. In order to
do this, reliance would be placed on section 409 of the CAMA
which provides for three situations in which a company is deemed
to be unable to pay its debts: (a) where it is unable to pay an
amount due within three weeks after the service of a demand
notice; (b) where execution on a court judgment is returned
unsatisfied; and (c) where the court, after taking into account any
contingent or prospective liability of the company, is satisfied that
the company is unable to pay its debts.
Upon filing for reorganization, a forty-five day moratorium
against all enforcement actions would be triggered.239 The court
would have a discretion as to whether or not to extend this period
and should exercise this discretion with extreme caution and only
for "good reason. '2 4' Among other things, the moratorium would
prevent the following: immediate liquidation of the company,
enforcement of charges against corporate assets or the appointment
of a receiver or manager under any instrument, and the institution
or continuation of enforcement proceedings against the company
in court. Within the moratorium period, the company would be
afforded breathing space to prepare for mediation by making the
requisite disclosures to all stakeholders, setting a date for the
mediation,241 and appointing an independent bankruptcy mediator.
However, the moratorium would not give the debtor company
239 The moratorium would not apply to criminal proceedings against the company or
its directors. Later, the grounds for lifting the moratorium will be considered.
240 It is not possible at this point to enumerate the exact circumstances that would
qualify as "good reason." Suffice it to say that the expression is best interpreted on a
case by case basis. In addition, the burden of proof would be on the applicant.
241 The date would be no later than forty-five days after the moratorium is triggered.
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unrestrained freedom to deal with corporate assets, particularly
secured assets, in a manner adverse to the interests of creditors.242
The general principle that would govern disclosure
requirements is that security holders should receive timely and
sufficient information to enable them to make an informed
decision as to whether or not to accept any proposed plan of
reorganization. Examples of matters to be disclosed include: the
expected return that would be available to the security holders if
the company were to be wound up immediately;243 a list of all
known creditors and the amount owed to each of them; a list of all
interested persons - e.g., a creditor who is also a director or
shareholder (or a relative or spouse of such person); a report on the
financial position of the company; the name of the bankruptcy
mediator including the remuneration to be paid for his services;
and a brief explanation of what mediation is all about, its benefits,
the effect of participation, and the consequences of non-
participation (i.e., the fall-back remedy). 2"
Arguably, a forty-five day moratorium period is not long
enough to create incentives for its abuse by directors in spite of the
fact that debtor initiation (of reorganization) under this model is
practically unconditional. David Brown has also contended that,
in the case of creditor initiation, the same test as is used for
initiation by directors should not be applied. His argument is that
"it would be unfair (and impracticable, given informational
disadvantages for most creditors) if a company was involuntarily
placed into any sort of formal procedure unless creditors could
show that their rights were at risk due to insolvency or imminent
insolvency., 245 He therefore suggested that the test for creditor
initiation should be the same as under a winding up. This explains
why it is suggested that entry into reorganization, where the initial
filing is by creditors, should be premised upon proof of the
company's inability to pay its debts.
242 This is one of the grounds for lifting the moratorium.
243 The bankruptcy mediator will play a prominent role in determining the
liquidation value of the company.
244 The provisions of the Australian Corporations Regulations of 1990 (Regulation
5.1.01 (1) (Austl.)) are particularly instructive in this regard.
245 BROWN 2000, supra note 27, at 44.
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2. The Role of the Bankruptcy Mediator
At the moment, there is no distinct group of professionals who
may be called upon to perform the role of bankruptcy mediators in
Nigeria. As the name suggests, it is envisaged that these persons
would be experienced bankruptcy practitioners (whether as
investment bankers, accountants, or legal practitioners) and
mediators. It is also expected that, at some point in the future, the
CAC would create a special bankruptcy mediation division with
the aim of making mediators available to distressed companies at
reduced costs - though parties would still be free to appoint an
independent individual professional not affiliated with the CAC.
In addition to his primary role as a facilitator of negotiation
between the parties, the mediator would also be responsible for
determining the liquidation value of the company. This is an
important piece of the information to be provided in the notices
summoning all interested parties to mediation. At the request of a
party in interest, the mediator could also perform the role of an
"examiner, ' in which case he would be obliged to investigate
the affairs of the debtor company, including any allegations of
fraud, incompetence, misconduct or mismanagement. The result
of such investigation should ideally be disclosed to the parties
prior to mediation, but may also be disclosed at the beginning of
mediation.
The directors of the debtor company along with all the
members and creditors of the company must be invited to
mediation. On the first day of mediation, the mediator should go
over his role with the parties, reiterating the voluntary and
confidential nature of mediation. He also should inform the
parties of the consequences of deciding not to participate or to sign
the reorganization plan at the end of mediation.247 The mediator
should then lay down procedural ground rules to be followed
throughout the mediation. Everyone must be given an opportunity
to speak in joint sessions, but nothing should prevent the mediator
from holding private sessions (caucuses) with particular groups or
individuals. On average, it is estimated that the process would
usually take a day or two, depending on the level of cooperation
among the parties, the competence of the mediator, and the degree
246 This term is borrowed from the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2003).
247 This idea is discussed below.
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of complexity involved.
Finally, the mediator would be required to draw up a
reorganization plan and to explain its contents to the parties.
Those who accept to be bound by the plan would be asked to sign
it - with the directors signing on behalf of the company. The
agreement would, however, not be valid until the mediator has
certified that the plan is feasible by appending his signature to it.
In determining the feasibility of a plan, he should take the
following factors into consideration: (a) the adequacy of the
capital structure; (b) the earning power of the business; (c)
economic conditions; (d) the ability of management; and (e) the
probability of the continuation of the same management.248 This is
essential in order not to delay liquidation any further should it
prove to be inevitable.
3. Failed and Successful Mediations
Persons who refuse to participate in mediation or to be bound
by the reorganization plan would nevertheless be entitled to
receive no less than what they would have received if the company
were to be liquidated immediately. This is very important from
both efficiency and fairness perspectives. As an exit strategy, the
value seems to be equitable since it takes the best interest of the
security holders outside of reorganization into account. Hence, no
one would be structurally coerced into accepting a reorganization
plan against his wishes. From an efficiency standpoint, the exit
strategy also provides a means of ensuring that reorganization
would only be pursued if the value of the reorganized company is
greater than its liquidation value. Intuitively, a security holder
would only consider reorganization if it promises him something
over and above his entitlement in liquidation. It is, however, up to
him (after perusing disclosed materials and with the guidance of
the mediator) to decide when the reorganized value is greater than
the liquidation value.
There are two circumstances in which mediation would be
deemed to have failed: (a) where the parties reject the
reorganization plan; and (b) where the mediator concludes that the
plan is not feasible. In both situations, there should be an
automatic conversion to liquidation. On the other hand, where
248 See In re Landmark at Plaza Park, 7 Bankr. 653 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980).
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mediation is successful, the reorganization plan should bind the
debtor company and only those claimants who accept to be bound
by it. This is a marked departure from the existing regime which
is dominated by classification and voting (or majority rule)
requirements. By eliminating both requirements, security holders,
especially minority claimants, would be given the opportunity to
decide their commercial fate themselves.
Typically, the incumbents would remain in control of the
debtor company and also assume responsibility for implementing
the reorganization plan. However, after an adverse report from the
mediator in his role as an examiner, the plan could also provide for
the removal of an incumbent board or the appointment of a
director to the board to represent the interests of the creditors.
This director would monitor the implementation of the plan and
report back to the creditors in case anything goes wrong. In the
event that the implementation proves to be unsuccessful, the
parties would revert to their respective positions prior to
reorganization and the company would proceed straight into
liquidation unless the parties agree otherwise.
4. The Role of the Court
In order to prevent abuse of the system, the court would still
have a considerable (though minimal) supervisory role to play. At
various stages in the reorganization process, the court would have
the power to make an order voiding an approved reorganization
plan or the appointment of a bankruptcy mediator on specified
grounds, including incompetence or lack of independence on the
part of the mediator, fraud, and non-feasibility of the proposed or
approved plan. The court would also have power to entertain
applications challenging the stated liquidation value of the
company, to lift the moratorium, or to extend its period. All
applications would have to be brought within a period of one
month after the approval of the plan.
In deciding whether or not to lift the moratorium, the court
should strike an equitable balance between the interests of the
debtor company, the creditors as a group, and the applicant. In the
United States, relief is granted upon a "showing of cause which
has no clear definition and is determined on a case-by-case
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basis. 249 Indeed, such decision is "committed to the sound
discretion of the bankruptcy court."25 Section 362(d)(1) of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides one example of sufficient 'cause'
- lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of an
applicant party in interest. In the proposed model, the court should
exercise its discretion to prevent rapid and imminent dissipation of
corporate assets. The importance of this role cannot be
overemphasized and the court has to be proactive in guarding
against value-destroying applications.
V. Conclusion
Under the existing regime, it is possible to implement the
mediation-based approach outlined above if all affected parties
unanimously agree to do so. However, this paper should be seen
as a call for the reform of the law of corporate reorganizations in
Nigeria through legislative action. Even though there is no
substantial reason for restricting the application of the new
approach to small and medium-scale corporations, a more
streamlined version of Part XVI of the CAMA should be applied
by large corporations if, at an early stage in its implementation, the
approach proves to be ineffective for these companies.
Finally, a good follow-up to this paper would entail conducting
empirical research relating to the principal interests of secured
creditors in reorganization. The outcome of this study would help
shed more light on the general attitude of these creditors to
reorganization, particularly on the question whether secured
creditors are interested only in recovering their money or whether
they are also interested in maintaining continued relationships with
debtor companies; thus, laying the foundation for future research
work in the area.
249 In re PATEL, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 263, *7-8; see also U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2003).
250 In re Conejo Enters., Inc., 96 F.3d 346, 351 (9th Cir. 1996).
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